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ABSTRACT 
 
The Economics of Prozac: 
Do Employees Really Gain from Strong Employment Protection?*
 
Unlike many other contracts, employment contracts are subject to various external 
administrative procedures governing separations, ranging from compulsory severance 
payments and advance notice periods (usually seniority based), to collective layoff 
procedures (usually depending on the firm’s size), and other forms of protections against 
arbitrary dismissal. These external constraints may raise the wellbeing of workers if 
everything remains constant, but may fail to do so once other economic channels are 
accounted for. Here, we explore the effect of such legislation on the firm’s attitude towards 
insiders (i.e. protected workers), notably worker monitoring, working environment, and 
ultimately what we could term harassment. We show that during downturns, harassing 
workers in order to induce a quit is a substitute for greater dismissal freedom, and that 
intense monitoring and depreciated working conditions will occur. Thus, a more protected 
workforce may loose more than it gains from non-pecuniary pressures exerted by the firm. 
We test these mechanisms using data from a panel of Canadian individuals (the National 
Public Health Survey) including details on work-related stress and the consumption of various 
medications, including anti-depressants. By exploiting cross-province differences in 
employment protection legislation (EPL), we cannot reject the theoretical hypothesis: we 
even find positive links between individual employment protection and some dimensions of 
stress, and weaker but positive links between employment protection, depression and the 
consumption of various psychotropic drugs. Tenure and firm size information from another 
dataset is then used to generate further variance in EPL by imputation. This confirms the 
previous results, as well as falsification exercises: family stress for instance is not correlated 
with regional EPL, while financial stress is negatively correlated with EPL. 
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Is employment protection legislation (EPL) an eﬃcient device for raising the well-being of
workers? It has long been known that the answer to this question is mixed: all else being
constant, employment protection increases job duration and might therefore be beneficial to
currently employed workers. However, it is also well established that EPL reduces job hiring.
That is, it fails to raise the well-being of outsiders, i.e. non-employed workers and workers
not covered by EPL, including workers under probationary periods, temporary workers and
part-timers.1 This paper argues that this line of reasoning may even understate the adverse
eﬀects of EPL and that EPL can also result into more job dissatisfaction of protected employees
themselves, which is quite paradoxical. We argue that protection against individual dismissals
raises pressures from management, bullying, workers’ stress and, to a lesser extent, the incidence
of distress and depression.
These ideas may sound counterintuitive. However, such behavior by the management is
relatively easy to understand in a context where layoﬀ costs are large and the success of indi-
vidual dismissal procedures is random: firms can react according to several margins. Our first
task is to attempt to decompose the “economics of bullying”, and identify the various margins
involved. A simple monitoring and eﬀort model is developed in which firms can also aﬀect the
working environment of workers, for the better or for the worst. Broadly speaking, we find a
rationalization of the behavior of workers and firms in response to high EPL, which fall into two
categories, partial vs. general equilibrium eﬀects. In partial equilibrium, firms indeed react to
higher layoﬀs taxes2 by adjusting monitoring methods, routines and workplace organization and
management techniques. In an environment where layoﬀ is costly, and monitoring may become
more intensive with more repetitive routines to simplify monitoring. Firms may induce quitting
by deteriorating the work environment and in some extreme cases, harass workers.3 None of
these aspects is particularly gratifying for workers, resulting in more stress and job dissatisfac-
tion. Since EPL in turn reduces the risk of layoﬀ, the net eﬀect on workers’ present-discounted
value of holding a job is ambiguous. In general equilibrium, EPL reduces turnover and thus
raises unemployment spell and possibly the quasi-rent associated with holding a job. Fear of
layoﬀ is thus exacerbated as workers have more to loose. In addition, quitting is more costly
even when workers don’t like their job anymore.
How sound are these mechanisms? Actually, one can find several indications that they are
quite pervasive. For instance, there are a number of monographic studies in France, a high
EPL country, emphasizing the poor quality of industrial relations. For instance, Seiler (2000),
surveying 1210 employees in Alsace at “Médecine du Travail” in a non-representative sample,
found that 9.6% of the workers met the criterion for moral harassment (bullying), although
only 7.3% reported it. It came from the hierarchy in 49% of cases, from co-workers in 25%
of cases, from both in 17% and only in 5% of cases from employees under supervision. It
started after workplace reorganization (29%), leave of absence by the worker (26%), the arrival
of a new manager (28%) or after some conflict. It led to various disorders (mood 72%, sleep
1e.g. see Lazear (1990), Burda (1992), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) and
Autor et al. (2006).
2To explain the main point here, EPL is first reduced to its most common perception: a pure tax to layoﬀs.
Two potentially important aspects of EPL are thus ignored: redistribution between firm and workers (Lazear
1990, Burda 1992) and the general diﬃculty for firms to layoﬀ for fault. This last point will be developed later in
the text.
3There are at least two excellent movies on these themes: Disclosure (1994) with Demi Moore and Michael
Douglas, on how to layoﬀ someone for fault ; and Le Placard (2001) with Gérard Depardieu and Daniel Auteuil,
on how to avoid such layoﬀs. Disclosure was translated into French Harcèlement (harassment).
2
70%, psychological disorder 52%) and resulted also in anxiety (60%) and abnormal fatigue.
Finally and most relevant for our purpose, the hostility faced by these employees led to leaving
the firm in 61% of cases, including 44% after a voluntary quit. Pressures are a substitute to
firing. A study carried out by the IPSOS poll institute, in 2000, based on a sample of 471
representative employees, revealed that 30% answered yes to “Have you ever faced bullying,
moral harassment?”, including 31% for men, 29% for women, 30% in the private sector, and
interestingly, 29% in public firms! 37% reported having witnessed bullying, moral harassment,
24% answered yes to ”Did your supervisor avoided or refused to talk, repeatedly and visibly?”,
16% answered yes to ”Did your supervisor took away responsibility, gave your workload to
colleagues?”, 12% had been once subjected to insults or oﬀending behavior from supervisor
(repeatedly), and also, 12% believed that bullies were intended to make the individual leave or
move to another department without indemnity.4
To document these ideas more formally, we will examine individual data and attempt to
link EPL with various indicators of well-being at work. The empirical strategy requires however
solving three main diﬃculties: a) psychological factors such as stress, distress and depression are
diﬃcult to measure; b) it is usually very diﬃcult to test for any of the eﬀects of EPL: there is
typically little variance in the data. Some studies rely on cross-country data with diﬃculties in
comparability. Finally, c) we need to separate partial equilibrium eﬀects from general equilibrium
eﬀects on the possible negative impact of EPL on workers.
We propose to remedy to these three issues, using original features from Canadian data and
Canadian labor legislation. On a) we use a very interesting Canadian database (National Pop-
ulation Health Survey, or NPHS), covering a representative sample of the Canadian population,
about 17 000 individuals, interviewed throughout 5 cycles of two years each, between 1994-1995
and 2002-2003. In this database, two sets of variables can be used to deal with the question:
i) subjective variables, such as answers to detailed questions related to stress at work along
various dimensions; ii) objective variables, such as various drug consumption habits (including
anti-depressants, tranquilizers, and sleeping pills5), and health questions potentially related to
stress such as blood pressure or, ultimately, depression. Interestingly, the survey also contains
a large selection of very useful control variables capturing various psychological factors, notably
the ability to cope with stress or to over-report stress (e.g. trauma in childhood).6
4Not suprisingly, France is also often cited as a country where psychotropics are consumed on a massive scale.
According to an oﬃcial study (DREES 2003), consumption of anti-depressants in France in 2000 amounted to
543 billion Euros, or 10% of the overall social security deficit (including pensions) and about 0.1% of GDP.
Recent international studies in clinical psychology, conducted in five European countries (Alonso et al. 2004),
have estimated multivariate models of psychotropic drug use, pooling six European countries and controlling
for various individual characteristics—gender, age categories, marital status, education, labor market status and
urbanicity. It is highly interesting to notice that the country eﬀects (expressed as odd-ratios of the regression)
are, in diminishing order, 3.0 for France, 2.3 for Spain, 2.0 for Italy, 1.69 for Belgium, and 0.8 for Germany, with
the Netherlands as the reference. The ranking is fairly close to the stringency of EPL according to the OECD,
although a definitive test would attempt to interact the ”employment status” coeﬃcient with the country eﬀects.
5As noted in several papers in medical as well as economic studies, sleep problems might be the outcome of
a working environment that is too tense. For instance, Akerstedt et al. (2002) find that in a “disturbed sleep”
logistic regression, the odd ratio (OR) of “high work demand” is 2.15. “Inability to stop thinking about work”
results into a OR of 3.20.
6Each type of variables, subjective and objective, has its pros and cons. Objective measures such as depression
are in principle more reliable than subjective variables (stress) with the usual caveats (Hamermesh 2004). The
quality of regressions with subjective variables will then rely on additional controls. On the other hand, depression
typically aﬀects fewer employed workers and raises endogeneity and selection concerns, through ”psychological
fragility” eﬀects. So we use both variables. We do, in fact, find in our data strong and positive correlations
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On b), we have two strategies. A first strategy is to use the large and stable in time cross-
provincial diﬀerences in the stringency of EPL.7 We build regional indicators of individual and
collective EPL and check ex-post that these indicators make sense in that they have the expected
correlation with other dimensions such as regional unemployment duration. The second strategy
exploits additional information from the Canadian Labor Force Survey to generate more precise
measures of the degree of eﬀective protection experienced by individuals: we will notably use
information on tenure and firms’ establishment and impute it into the NPHS survey. Finally,
on c) we match NPHS data to 1996 and 2001 Census data to obtain a precise measure of local
labor market conditions at the county level (geographical division of the Census). This allows
investigating whether higher local unemployment aﬀects the well-being of workers beyond EPL.
A couple of robust results emerge: first, stress at work resulting from conflicting demands
is positively associated with individual employment protection. The same is true from stress
from relations with co-workers and the management, positively associated with individual EPL.
We also find that stress from layoﬀ is negatively associated with employment protection. The
net eﬀect on total stress at work, summing up these dimensions, is still positive. The overall
eﬀect are not large, but significant: a shift of individual EPL from the lowest to the highest
region is associated with about 15% of a standard deviation of total stress. This fraction reaches
20% if one adds up the eﬀect of employment protection against mass layoﬀs. However, up to
one standard deviation of stress from conflicting demands or from relations with supervisor and
co-workers can be explained by EPL. We can conclude that EPL does not reduce workers’ stress.
We also find that local labor market conditions do not really aﬀect stress at work. Other factors,
such as the incidence of depression or the consumption of psychotropic drugs, are marginally
aﬀected by EPL.
A conclusion of the paper is that the quality of labor relations is adversely aﬀected by reg-
ulations of labor. In that, we confirm the importance of industrial relations and beyond, of
trust in social relations between unions and employers, as recently emphasized by Blanchard
and Philippon (2004, 2006). Our paper suggests that EPL can generate individual conflicts
and poor industrial relations, explaining both the relative stability of the poor quality of labor
relations in Europe. This is also consistent with the recent improvement in industrial relations
in the UK pointed out by Blanchard and Philippon (2004, page 24) after the Thatcher’s dereg-
ulation experience in 1980’s. Another lesson of the paper is to understand and generalize other
results on the paradoxical adverse consequences of EPL: recently, Postel-Vinay and Saint-Martin
(2005), Clark and Postel-Vinay (2004), and Deloﬀre and Rioux (2004) have documented a strong
negative link between the perception of job security and employment protection, using the Eu-
ropean Community Panel survey. The NPHS data used here contain a specific question on how
respondents perceive the risk of losing their job and the stress derived from it. We are thus able
to investigate the same question asked by these three papers, as a special case. Finally, there are
to our knowledge no studies in labor economics linking stress and more generally health with
employment conditions — in particular EPL. However, there may be economic links of first-order
between the intensity of stress experienced by individuals and the incidence of depression or the consumption
psychotropic drugs.
7One should definitely prefer identification obtained from variations across comparable geographical units, ide-
ally with time-variations such as in Autor et al. (2006) or Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) in the United States.Data
on stress at work are however diﬃcult to find in the US over the relevant period, but the replication of these
strategies is the next step in a general research program. This first step is however useful in emphasizing a few
unexpected facts regarding the links between EPL and stress.
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importance and more work is needed.
1 A model
The model is designed to illustrate the various adjustments mechanisms in a firm facing restric-
tions on its ability to fire workers. It will illustrate that a worker’s utility may actually decrease
with employment protection, because precisely employers react to EPL.
The setup is as follows. Workers live two periods only and then die. The firm is indefinitely
lived. The model focusses on two relevant time periods where the firm and the worker are
matched. In the first period, the worker is already employed in the firm: we do not focus on hiring
decisions, although this would be a straightforward extension. Productivity and idiosyncratic
utility of the worker are revealed only at the end of the first period. Revelation of this information
leads to either a quit, a layoﬀ or the continuation of the employment relationship in second
period. Layoﬀ costs aﬀect the separation decision, and thus the first-period eﬀort strategy of
the worker and the monitoring by the firm.
1.1 Worker and quits
Each period, the worker chooses an eﬀort level e on the job, and receives a wage w. The wage
is assumed to be exogenous.8 Overall, the flow utility of a worker is
U = w
wage
+
Ã
−[c(e) + qm]
disutility from eﬀort and of monitoring
+ qw
firm’s eﬀort to aﬀect U
+ ν
random utility of match
!
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
non-pecuniary component of the job
, (1)
where the utility of the worker is reduced by c(e) + qm, where qm ≥ 0 is the intensity of
monitoring, and c(e) is increasing convex in eﬀort. The quantity qw is a variable chosen by the
firm to aﬀect the utility of the worker. It is interpreted as the quality of the working environment.
This quantity can be either positive or negative. In addition, ν is a random variable reflecting
unknown factors ex-ante, such as the quality of the relationship of the worker with his/her
colleagues or with the management. The modelling choices imply that monitoring and working
conditions are perfect substitutes and thus, in this case, are formally the same ”object”. The
quantity qm−qw+ν reflects the general environment of the firm, which is both random through
ν and chosen by the firm through the q’s.
The worker can obtain a level of utility U outside the firm. This level of utility depends
a priori on search frictions and is lower in a more sclerotic labor market, although we do not
explicit this link in the paper. Thus, if not fired, the worker will quit the firm at the end of
period 1 if utility on the job in period 2 is lower than U .
8By this exogeneity assumption, we want to prevent employers to cut down the wage so that the worker would
necessarily quit at zero cost for the firm. This assumption is meant to capture the fact that such an explicit
behavior by firms is limied by nominal downards wage rigidity. The fact is that a strong wage cut may be as
eﬃcient as bullying to make workers quit, but this can be detected by a judge much more easily and thus ex-post
quite costly. We will come back on this point in the conclusion of this Section.
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1.2 Firm and layoﬀ
Monitoring and aﬀecting working conditions is not costless. Let C(qm, qw) be the cost function
with qm ≥ 0 and qw ≷ 0. The monitoring intensity qm is set each period. In contrast, working
conditions are persistent through the two periods, and are decided in period 1.9 So, by the cost
of qw, we refer here to the cost paid in period 1, which does not has to be repaid in period
2. The cost function is assumed to be increasing and convex in both arguments. Further, the
minimum cost is reached in C(0, 0) = 0. This means that it costs some money to aﬀect–either
positively or negatively–working conditions of the worker. Note that the cost of a negative qw
can be interpreted as a reputation cost.
The eﬀort of the worker enters linearly in the revenue function, as a normalization. There is
a random productivity component denoted by ε. So, overall, the flow profit of the firm is
π = e
worker’s eﬀort to aﬀect π
− w
wage
− C(qm, qw)
cost from monitoring and working conditions
+ ε
random productivity of match
.
At the end of period 1, when ε and ν are revealed, the firm may decide to terminate the
employment relation which has exogenous value π minus possible separation costs. Separation
can be implemented in several ways. Most simply, the firm can fire the worker the worker for
economic reasons (that is, a non-fault layoﬀ denoted hereafter by NF-layoﬀ), which costs τ to
the firm. A fraction ατ accrues to the worker. This is a severance payment with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
The case α = 0 corresponds to termination costs being a pure firing tax: the worker receives no
transfer. A pure severance payment is when α = 1.10 It can also try to save on firing costs in
two diﬀerent ways: first, by attempting to layoﬀ for fault or for cause (a F-layoﬀ), which has
no cost but has uncertain success. Second, by letting the worker quit. In the case of a quit, we
assume that there is no cost of separation.
Why would the firm fire for economic reason if it can fire for cause at no cost? The answer
is that a F-layoﬀ is a random procedure, in the sense that, as commonly observed in several
countries, the conflict between a firm and a worker is arbitrated by an outside party (judge,
semi-professional court) and the decision, based on several informal factors, can not always be
anticipated. We will denote by F the probability of success of this procedure, and F is a function
of the various decisions made by the agents in period 1. How does this work here? Denote by e
the exogenous, common-knowledge reference eﬀort; the eﬀort exerted by the worker e may diﬀer
from the target e. When it is below e, the firm can try to prove a fault. The randomness of
the F-procedure is due to the fact that e is not directly observable by a third party. This is a
frequent assumption in the contract literature. Accordingly, the success probability F depends
positively on e− e: the further away from the eﬀort requirement, the easier to establish a fault.
Second, we assume that F depends positively on the monitoring intensity: as the information
set about the worker’s activity is larger due to closer and more accurate control by the firm, it
is easier for the firm to establish a fault. Finally, although this is not essential here, we further
assume a complementarity between monitoring intensity qm and the eﬀort gap e − e , as the
marginal impact of shirking should be larger, the more intense the monitoring.
Assumption 1. The success of the layoﬀ procedure for fault F positively depends on qm(e−
9This is not important: what matters is that the firm sets qw before the information on productivity and
idiosyncratic utility is revealed.
10A strictly positive α makes sure the worker never quits in the NF-regime: she/he is strictly better oﬀ in
waiting the layoﬀ and receiving ατ .
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e):
F = F [qm(e− e)]
where F 0 > 0.
Finally, being subject to a procedure for fault may generate additional disutility to the
worker, denoted by -Σ. Fixing Σ = 0 has however no implication for the results of the model,
but a positive Σ helps to understand why in practice, workers under the threat of a procedure
for fault may prefer to quit more frequently instead of starting a conflict with the management.
Table A in Appendix summarizes all notations.
1.3 Timing of events
The timing of events is as follows.
• First period starts. The firm and the worker only know the distributions of ε and ν.
• Both jointly determine their levels of e, qm and qw in a Nash equilibrium. Recall that the
value of qw is fixed for the two periods of the match.
• Idiosyncratic components of productivity ε and utility ν are revealed.
• Knowing this and correctly anticipating the future events, the worker then decides whether
or not to quit.
• If he/she does not quit, the firm may continue the employment relationship or instead
lay-oﬀ the worker, in picking up one of the two available procedures (F or NF).
• Second period starts with predetermined value of qw, and known values of ε and ν.
2 Solution of the model
We proceed backward. First, we solve for optimal separation strategies–layoﬀ and then quits
in considering e, qm and qw as given. Second, we determine the choices on e, qm and qw, when
agents correctly anticipate the separation strategies.
2.1 Optimal separation strategies of the firm
When the worker has not resigned at the end of period 1, the firm needs to decide whether
or not to keep the worker or to start a dismissal procedure. In period 2, the firm will face a
continuation value π0(ε) with the current worker (remember that ε and ν are now known from
the firm), and an outside profit value π with another worker. As the second period is terminal
for a worker, we will set e0 = e the minimum level of eﬀort; and the firm does not need to
reinvest in qw since it was fixed in period 1. Thus, π0(ε) = ε+ e− w − C(0, 0) = ε+ e−w.
We thus need to compare the relative values of the various strategies.
• NF (no-fault) has value π − τ
• F (fault) has value πF + (1− F )π0(ε)
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• C (continuation) has value π0(ε) = ε+ e− w
These three values for the firm are functions of ε, with a slope respectively of 0, 1− F and
1, leading to two reservation rules in ε, denoted by ε and bε:
C ∼ F : ε = π + w − e (2)
NF ∼ F : bε = ε− τ/(1− F ) < ε. (3)
Note that ε is a function of parameters only and notably exogenous to both eﬀort e and firm’s
controls qw and qm.
Proposition 1. i) If ε > ε, the firm wants to retain the worker ; ii) if ε < bε, it wants
to initiate a no-fault dismissal procedure ; iii) if ε is in between these two quantities, it starts a
procedure for fault.
The proof is in Appendix, its intuition is straightforward. When productivity is high, the
firms wants to retain the worker. If productivity is very low, since the F-layoﬀ strategy is risky,
the firm is ready to pay the full layoﬀ cost τ . In between, the firm hopes to save on layoﬀ costs
with a F-layoﬀ strategy that has a limited downside risk if it fails.
Corollary 1. Let G be the cumulative density function of ε. The fraction of workers facing
a procedure for fault is G(w − e) − G(w − e − τ/(1 − F )). This is increasing in the cost of
a no-fault dismissal τ and the success rate of the procedure for professional fault F . With a
uniform density function, w − e has no impact on that fraction.
Proof: simple calculations.
The corollary states that the higher τ/(1− F ), that is, the easier to use the F-strategy and
the higher the NF-layoﬀ costs, the more likely to observe workers under a layoﬀ for cause.
2.2 Optimal quit strategies of the worker
Moving one step backward, one can now investigate the optimal quit strategy of workers. Either
the worker quits–and obtain U– or he/she remains in the firm. In the latter case, the worker
correctly anticipates the strategy of the firm (C, NF, F) in the next stage and correctly evaluates
utility in each case, as follows:
• Q (quit) has value U
• NF (no-fault) has value U + ατ
• F (fault) has value FU + (1− F )(w + ν + qw − c(e))−Σ
• C (continuation) has value w + ν + qw − c(e)
We can show that the worker’s strategy depends on the revealed random component of utility
ν and is also described by two reservation rules ν and bν:
Q ∼ C : ν = U − w − qw + c(e), (4)
Q ∼ F : bν = ν +Σ/(1− F ). (5)
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At this stage of period 1, the worker knows the revealed value of ε, hence:
Proposition 2. i) If the match has low productivity ( ε < bε), the worker never quits because
she/he expects a no-fault layoﬀ and thus to obtain severance payment ατ > 0; ii) if the match
has high productivity, that is, if ε > ε, the worker expects to be retained by the firm but would
quit anyhow if and only if its utility in the match is low ( ν < ν); iii) for intermediate values of
productivity, i.e. if bε < ε < ε, the worker expects a procedure for fault. He/she then quits if and
only if ν < bν.
Corollary 2 (mismatch) The conditional mean of ν in surviving matches is decreased by
a lower level of higher of U . To the extent that EPL aﬀects negatively U in general equilibrium,
EPL increases utility mismatch (in the sense of more matches associated with a low idiosyncratic
utility).
Most of the eﬀects of the corollaries above are easy to understand. We can now summarize
the various mechanisms.
2.3 Separation decisions
Figure 1 conveniently summarizes the partition of the plane (ε, ν) into diﬀerent separation /
no separation outcomes. The distance between bε and ε is given by τ/(1 − F ): as said above,
employment protection as well as successful F procedures raise the inter-frontier space in which
firms wish to layoﬀ for fault. The distance between bν and ν is given by Σ/(1 − F ): workers
quit when the idiosyncratic component of utility is too low, but there is an extra-quit incentive
to quit if workers anticipate stress Σ from the F-layoﬀ procedure. Overall, the surface of the
F-layoﬀ area is [νmax − U + w + qw − Σ/(1 − F ) − e] ∗ τ/(1 − F ), thus at given e, qm and qw,
F-layoﬀ is more likely with higher frictions (discouraging workers to quit), with higher wages
(workers take a chance to win the case with probability 1 − F ) and with increased by higher
firing cost τ .
To sum up the impact of EPL derived so far, we have that:
1. The no-fault firing costs τ raise the likelihood of a procedure for fault and thus the asso-
ciated stress (see corollary 1);
2. To the extent that τ discourages hirings in general equilibrium, that is, reduces outside
options of workers U , a higher τ increases the degree of mismatch of employed workers.
2.4 Optimal eﬀort e, monitoring qm, and working conditions qw
We now investigate the role of employment protection on the optimal level of e, qw and qm. We
will assume a Nash equilibrium between the firm and the worker in the choice of these quantities.
Recall that the level of eﬀort is chosen before the realization of ν and ε, but after knowing their
distribution, and in taking qw and qm as given.
The worker knows exactly how eﬀort e reduces the success of the fault procedure and thus
the separation strategy of the firm, as well as her/his own propensity to quit. See the Appendix
equations (A1). Symmetrically, the firm knows how its decisions qw and qm aﬀect quits, its own
separation margins and F , as indicated in (A2) in Appendix. The full program of the worker
and of the firm is also in Appendix (equations A3 and A4). To fix ideas, we assume that the
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εˆ (e,qm) ε  (νmin, εmin) 
   Σ/(1-F) 
 
ε: idiosyncratic productivity 
of the match for the firm 
v  
vˆ (e,qm) 
 
ν: idiosyncratic utility of 
the match for the worker 
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Continuation F layoff 
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Figure 1: Phase diagram of separation / non-separation decisions, with bε = π+w−e−τ/(1−F )
; ε = π + w − e; ν = U − w − qw + c(e) ; bν = U −w − qw + c(e) + Σ/(1− F )
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density of ε and ν are uniform, with g(ε) = g0 and g(ν) = h0, but this is not essential. A similar
convenient assumption is when costs functions are quadratic with unit scale parameter: c(e) = e2
and C(qm, qw) = (qm)2 + (qw)2. Finally, a more demanding assumption is that F 0/(1 − F )2 is
constant (see Appendix for the implied F ). We however make this assumption only in the next
sub-section in order to obtain closed-form solutions.
2.5 Special case: density of worker’s utility ν is a mass point (no quit)
Before solving for the full program of both the agent and the firm, one may study the simpler
case in which the density of ν is collapsed to a mass point higher than bν: in other words,
the worker will never quit the firm, which reduces the problem to studying firms’ separation
decisions. In this case, the programs of the worker and the firm lead to conveniently simpler
first order conditions. All intermediate derivations are in Appendix, as well as a proof of the
existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for general costs functions. In the special case
is when F 0/(1 − F )2 = Φ where Φ is a constant, we can further greatly simplify the solutions
and illustrate the role of τ quite simply. In this case, solutions to the problem are:
e =
∆
1 +∆
e, qm =
τ2
1 +∆
g0
2
e, qw = 0 (6)
where ∆ = τ3(ατ +Σ)g20Φ
2. (7)
Proposition 3. The various eﬀect of EPL are: i) equilibrium eﬀort is increasing in τ with
a local exponent 3 when τ is small and in severance payment ατ . As τ goes to infinity, eﬀort
converges to the maximum e ; ii) equilibrium monitoring intensity is increasing in τ for low
values of τ , reaches a maximum and then gradually goes down to zero when τ →∞.
Most intuitions are easy to get. The elasticity of eﬀort e to layoﬀ costs τ is initially —for low
values of τ— of order 3 or even 4 if Σ was small, because several eﬀects reinforce each other: as
τ is higher, firms use F -layoﬀs and for low values of τ , this raises qm. Workers counteract in
raising eﬀort, and so on and so forth. When τ becomes large, the eﬀort of the worker approaches
its limit e and so after a while, the firm reduces its monitoring, hence the negative slope of qm
when τ is large.
In equilibrium, the welfare eﬀect of employment protection of a worker in his job can also be
calculated. The impact of τ on instantaneous utility is equal to (−c0(e)∂e/∂τ)+(−∂qm/∂τ) : the
first term is always negative, while the second one is negative for low values of τ . Intertemporal
utility is ∂U/∂τ = ∂U/∂qm.∂qm/∂τ and signs as −∂qm/∂τ , i.e. first negative then positive as
τ grows. In other words, the eﬀect of τ on workers’ utility is ambiguous: one the one hand, it
reduces the firing probability which is positive on the present discounted value (PDV) of utility
evaluated in period 1. On the other hand, τ raises monitoring qm and in reaction, raises eﬀorts.
This reduces worker’s flow utility and may also reduce the PDV of utility if the second eﬀect
dominates over the first one.
2.6 General case
In the general case, it is impossible to derive closed form solution for e, qm and qw, and not even
to prove uniqueness. The reason is that the model contains both tendencies towards multiple
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equilibria–as e and qm are strategic complements through F– and towards corner solutions,
as shown in the simple cases above–as qm and qw are substitute controls variables for the firm.
Nevertheless, the first order conditions of the firm and the worker can be derived easily and
are fairly intuitive. Thanks to assumption Φ = F 0/(1− F )2 we can further simplify these first
order conditions but this is not needed here. See the Appendix for details. Worker’s eﬀort is
determined by a first order condition:
e = qmg0Φτ [ατ +Σ(1−H(bν))] (8)
where H is the c.d.f. of random variable ν. The left-hand side is the marginal cost of eﬀort,
equalized to the marginal return, which is the sum of two terms. In equation (A13) in Appendix,
we see that the first one is due to the eﬀect of a lower layoﬀ-rate ∂bε/∂e and the second one is
due to the eﬀect of a higher quit rate -∂bν/∂e to avoid the stress cost Σ when the worker quits
(ν > bν) hence the coeﬃcient (1−H(bν). The equation shows that the marginal return on eﬀort
is always strictly positive, and is increasing in qm and τ .
Firm’s first order conditions in an interior solution for qm and qw imply
qm = g0τ2(e− e)Φ
µ
1− 1−H(bν)
2
¶
− τh0
2
(1−G(bε)) (Σ(e− e)Φ) ≶ 0 (9)
qw =
τh0
2
µ
−τ
2(1− F )
¶
+
h0
2
(1−G(ε)(εmax − ε) ≶ 0 (10)
The left-hand side in the first line is the marginal cost of monitoring for the firm. It is equal
to the marginal return on the right-hand side. The marginal return is itself the sum of two terms:
the first implies that raising monitoring intensity qm will increase the success of F -procedures
and thus increase profits because this saves on layoﬀ costs τ . This eﬀect is mitigated by the
second term which is negative: a higher qm raises the quit rate by workers even in the case
in which the firm would make profits, which occurs with probability 1 − G(bε). In an interior
solution, qm is increasing in e− e and in τ , at a fix Φ. When the second term dominates (high
profits), the firm reaches a corner solution qm = 0: it does not monitor the worker to reduce
its quit rate, as monitoring reduces utility. The second line has a similar interpretation. When
the first negative term in the right-hand side dominates, the firm expects to makes losses and
thus, by setting qw to a negative value, it can induce more quits and save τ . When the second
positive term dominates instead, the firm makes profits and can reduce turnover by raising qm
above 0.
These equations point out a key mechanism: the impact of τ on firm’s attitude towards the
worker depends on its perception of future profits. If, in period 1, the firm expects jobs to be
profitable, that is for large values of ε, it prefers to retain the worker and decrease qm and raise
qw. In non-viable jobs instead, the firm will make negative profits. It may want to save on layoﬀ
costs τ , and raises qm to establish a fault. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 4. In viable jobs, firms have to maintain positive working conditions, all the
more than current profits are high relative to outside profits. To reduce turnover, firms do not
monitor workers.
Proposition 5. (“placardisation”) In non-viable jobs, working conditions have to be
negative, all the more than τ is large.
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Unreported numerical resolutions provide additional insights. In the first case, we investigate
the role of layoﬀ costs τ in the context of a relatively viable job. When τ increases, the firm
raises monitoring intensity, so as to induce eﬀort and have an option to fire for fault, but at the
same time raise working conditions, in order to retain the worker. The net eﬀects on worker’s
welfare are ambiguous: instantaneous utility decreases slowly with τ , while the PDV of utility
of the worker increases at low τ but then decreases at higher τ . In constrast, when jobs are
non-viable, the firm anticipates that it will have to fire at the end of the period. So, when τ
increases, the firm rapidly raises its monitoring intensity so as to induce eﬀort, but, contrary
to the previous case, the firm worsens working conditions to increase the quit propensity of
the worker. Per-period utility of the worker decreases very fast, and the PDV of utility is also
strongly reduced.
2.7 Summary and further discussion of the model
Precisely, coming back to equation (1), we can identify three components which may match the
data in the subsequent empirical analysis: c(e), qm and Σ will all enter additively and negatively
into flow utility. There is in addition a fourth component, qw which can aﬀect utility both ways.
Hereafter, by ”stress”, we will have in mind c(e) + qm − qw +Σ.
The first eﬀect of EPL identified comes from the fact that firing is a monitoring device
(Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). As it becomes more expensive or more diﬃcult to lay oﬀ, managers
raise monitoring intensity and psychological pressures, thereby raising stress. We can group these
mechanisms under the label “intense monitoring eﬀect”. It generates a positive link between
individual EPL (as opposed to collective EPL, applying in the event of mass layoﬀs) and stress.
A second set of mechanisms arises when jobs are non-viable, i.e. in recessions or when a task
become obsolete. In such cases, an eﬃcient labor market would require firing for economic
reasons (no-fault layoﬀ). As this becomes more costly, the firm wants its worker to leave and
aﬀects negatively working conditions qw. The firm can also try to establish a professional fault
by raising monitoring intensity qmand obtain a dismissal at a lower cost, which potentially
generates further stress. We call this the “harassment eﬀect”.
Through these two partial equilibrium eﬀects, employment protection raises ”instantaneous”
stress and disutility of work, with some possible adverse eﬀects on the present discounted value
of being employed. General equilibrium would reinforce the adverse eﬀects of EPL, if we take as
granted that EPL raises frictions and lengthen unemployment spells. Greater frictions indeed
reduce the opportunities for workers to quit when they don’t like their job, colleagues and man-
ager: in a sclerotic labor market, employees must deal with low idiosyncratic utility seemingly
forever. This is referred to as the “mismatch eﬀect”. Our model has neglected other potentially
relevant and positive channels of EPL: with risk-averse workers, longer-running jobs generate a
partial equilibrium positive impact on utility. Further, EPL protects and thus induces specific
capital investments, an implication of standard contract theory applied to the labor market, see
e.g. Wasmer (2006).
Two additional issues need to be addressed at this stage. The first one is: why does the firm
maintain the wage constant when a wage cut could eﬃciently induce the worker to quit? The
answer is: both actions (wage cut and harassment) are considered as unfair. If a third party,
say a judge, is called to arbitrate, she/he could command a large fine or a large compensation
to the worker. The diﬀerence between the two actions is however that psychological pressures
are hard to prove, while wage cuts are fairly easy to detect. Raising stress by raising qm and
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reducing qw may be a more eﬀective way of inducing a quit.
A second and related issue is why, if workers anticipate bullying in second period, they do not
negotiate a small compensation with the firm and quit, instead of suﬀering from bullies? There is
no easy answer to this question, but the previous argument still apply: to the extent that moral
harassment will make the worker quit, the compensation should indeed be very small: from the
amount of compensation, a court would infer that there are unfair practices at the workplace.11
3 Data description
We now attempt to determine the sign and magnitude of the eﬀect of EPL on variables such as
stress, conflicts or psychological disorders.
3.1 NPHS individual data
The main database used here is the National Population Health Survey - Household component
- Longitudinal.12 It consists of 5 cycles, starting 1994-1995, then 1996-1997, then 1998-1999,
then 2000-2001 and finally 2002-2003. It includes 17 276 persons of all age, with a longitudinal
dimension and individual identifiers. The survey is designed to be representative of the cross-
section and has a longitudinal follow-up.13 The target population includes all residents in
Canada in 1994, excluding Indian Reserves and Crown Lands, health institutions, Canadian
Force bases and some remote areas in Ontario and Quebec. Northern regions (Yukon, Nunavut
and Northwest territories) where population density is very low were excluded from the analysis.
We provide in Table B1 in Appendix the sample composition per province, with a significant
number of individuals in each province. The attrition problem appears to be relatively limited:
73% of the original sample were interviewed for the five cycles over almost ten years. Attrition
includes deaths, while there are quite a few individuals having been temporarily unavailable in
a given cycle but re-interviewed in a subsequent cycle. The database is provided with sample
weights computed for each respondent in each cycle of the survey, and for each wave following
the first wave, various longitudinal weights (for all respondents or full respondents). We used
the latter weight.
The following variables are consistent throughout the sample: employment status (in the
week of reference and the year before the survey), the sector of activity (16 sectors), occupation
(47 occupations) and education, age, usual demographic information, etc.... The analysis will
be restricted to the sample of 25-64 y.o., excluding retirees. We decided to take out the 15-24
y.o. population since it is often employed in part-time jobs, and there is no available control for
11This verifiability argument–the fact that bullying is diﬃcult to observe– has actually further consequences:
monographic studies typically indicate that workers themselves typically misperceive what happens to them, in
the sense that they generally don’t know that they are subject to moral harassment. In our model, we have
assumed perfect foresight, but non-standard ingredients such as cognitive issues, as the inability of individuals
to realize the origin of the disutility the experience may be relevant. This brings us however far away than from
the simple point we wish to make in the model: determine what are the margins of adjustment of the firm facing
strong EPL and how they operate.
12A full, detailed description is available on the website of Statistics Canada, at http://www.statcan.ca/cgi-
bin/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=3225&lang=fr&db=IMDB&dbl=E&adm=8&dis=2
13For instance, the death of a longitudinal panel member is “confirmed against the Canadian Vital Statistics
Database — Deaths.”
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part-time in the relevant cycles, but including the 15-24 population did not change the results
much.
3.1.1 Stress: questions and specification
The questionnaire has several questions related to stress in several dimensions: family (partner),
family (children), at work, and due to financial problems. There are in particular 12 statements
related to factors potentially generating stress at work (denoted hereafter the base questions),
where the worker has to comment with possible answers being 1: strongly agree, 2: quite agree
; 3 neither agree or disagree ; 4 : quite disagree ; 5: strongly disagree.
These statements are: 1. Your job requires that you learn new things. 2. Your job requires a high
level of skill. 3. Your job allows you freedom to decide how you do your job. 4. Your job requires that
you do things over and over. 5. Your job is very hectic. 6. You are free from conflicting demands that
others make. 7. Your job security is good. 8. Your job requires a lot of physical eﬀort. 9. You have a
lot to say about what happens in your job. 10. You are exposed to hostility or conflict from the people
you work with. 11. Your supervisor is helpful in getting the job done. 12. The people you work with are
helpful in getting the job done. There is also a 13th question on job satisfaction: How satisfied are
you with your job? where possible answers range from very satisfied to very unsatisfied.
Based on these questions, derived stress questions were constructed independently by a team
of sociologists and made available by Statistic Canada to the research community: the variables
are included in the available dataset.14 There are 6 indicators of stress at work, a 7th derived
stress index (job strain) which is a combination of three of the previous stress indicators, and
finally an aggregate stress index built by the team, which adds up all six first dimensions of
stress.15 The stress variables are described as follows in the Manual:
• Skill Requirements: (0-12) (lower values means that higher skills are required for the job). This
derived variable determines the respondent’s task variety at main job in the past 12 months
• Decision Latitude - Decision Authority: (0-8) (higher values indicate lower decision authority).
This derived variable indicates whether the respondent’s main job in the past 12 months allows
them freedom on how to do their job and if they have a lot of say in what happens on their job.
• Psychological Demands: (0-8) (higher values indicate greater psychological demands). This derived
variable indicates if the respondent is free from conflicting demands that others make and if their
main job in the past 12 months is very hectic.
• Job Insecurity: (0-4) (higher values indicate greater job insecurity). This derived variable indicates
whether the respondent feels that their main job security is good.
14This team is lead by Blair Wheaton from the University of Toronto. The full description of
the data can be found page 122-128 in the Derived Variables Documentation 2004, available here
http://www.statcan.ca/english/sdds
/document/3225_D10_T9_V1_E.pdf. It is worth noting that the same questions and methodology are used
in similar surveys ran in other countries
15 In the original variables for stress at work created by the team of sociologists, the normalization of all
dimensions of stress are such that a higher number corresponds to higher stress, except for the dimension “skill
requirement”, which is higher, the lower this number. The original overall stress index adds up all dimensions.
Instead, I added all dimensions but ’Skill requirement’, which was substracted from the total instead. This
transformation marginally raises the fit and the significance of the regressions with the overall stress index,
without big implication.
15
• Physical Exertion: (0-4) (higher values indicate greater physical exertion). This derived variable
indicates whether the main job in the past 12 months requires a lot of physical eﬀort.
• Social Support: (0-12) (higher values indicate lower social support). This derived variable indicates
the social support available to the respondent at his/her main job in the past 12 months. Questions
are asked about whether or not the supervisor and the people the respondent worked with were
helpful in getting the job done, and whether the respondent was exposed to hostility or conflict
from the people they worked with.
• Job Strain: (0.2-5) (higher values indicate greater job strain). This derived variable indicates
whether the respondent experiences job strain. Job strain is measured as a ratio of psychological
demands and decision latitude which includes skill discretion and decision authority.
• Work Stress Index - All Items: (0-48) (higher values indicate greater work stress). This derived
variable determines the respondent’s perception about all dimensions of their work.16
3.1.2 Depression, anti-depressants and various other stuﬀ
We have several distress indicators. Among them, we select those based on objective clinical
characteristics of individuals. Notably, a Depression Scale (0-8) based on 21 questions on re-
spondent’s psychological and clinical state.17 and a Predicted Probability of Depression (0-1).18.
We also have questions on drugs use. For all respondents above 12 y.o., the interviewer asks the
following question on about 30 medications:
In the past month, that is, from [date one month ago] to yesterday, did [you/FNAME] take:
...tranquilizers such as Valium or Ativan? (yes/no)
...anti-depressants such as Prozac, Paxil or Eﬀexor? (yes/no)
...sleeping pills such as Imovane, Nytol or Starnoc? (yes/no)
The exact name of the medication is also reported and the respondent is asked to look at
the bottle, tube or box. We build dummy variables reflecting the use of such drugs, and also
a blood pressure indicator taking value 1 if the respondent is currently having abnormally high
blood pressure.
3.2 Firing restrictions
In Canada, employment protection diﬀers across provinces, along several dimensions such as
firing taxes, severance payment, the maximum number of days of temporary layoﬀ and finally
16The Manual of the longitudinal survey states that, due to a translation problem, ”In Quarter 3 of Cycle 1
(1994) collection, not all eligible working people were asked the work stress questions in the French interview. This
may result in some bias.” Further, a correction for refusals, included in Cycles 4 and 5, has not been implemented
for Cycle 1. For this reason, we will do most regressions with Cycle 4 and 5 only, with simply a comparison with
the three cycles included as a robustness check. The implication is that most regressions will be based on two
observations per individual, excluding the possibility of having eﬃcient fix eﬀect estimators.
17The score ”assesses the respondent’s depression state. The items used to measure depression are based
on the work of Kessler and Mroczek (from University of Michigan). They selected a subset of items from the
Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI) that measure major depressive episodes (MDE). The CIDI
is a structured diagnostic instrument that was designed to produce diagnoses according to the definitions and
criteria of both DSM-III-R and the Diagnostic Criteria for Research of the ICD-10.”
18 Internet Site: National Comorbidity Survey: www.hcp.med.harvard.edu/ncs/. Composite International Di-
agnostic Interview (CIDI): www.who.int/msa/cidi/index.htm
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advance notice. No systematic documentation for most of these dimensions exists at the provin-
cial level, because they are often a matter of jurisprudence, with an important exception: ad-
vance notice requirements for which no provision existed immediately after World War II were
progessively incorporated in regional laws, following courts decisions in specific cases.
Advance notice requirements are an important dimension of EPL: it reduces the discretion
of employers as regards to dismissals, it is often an implicit severance payment if the worker is
asked to stay at home during the period, and finally it has well-known eﬀects on hiring decisions
and the dynamics of labor markets.19 Diﬀerences across provinces can be seen in Figure B in
Appendix, from a table in Friesen et al. (1997) and Human Resources and Social Development
Canada (the Federal labor agency). An interesting feature for our purpose is that EPL has two
distinct dimensions: advance notice in case of individual layoﬀ, and advance notice in case of
mass layoﬀs. The length of notice depends on worker’s seniority. EPL in case of mass layoﬀ is
determined by firm’s size instead. Protection against individual layoﬀ is the variable we expect
to be more particularly associated with stress, given the insights from theory. As regards to
collective EPL, some provinces have no provision at all, such as Alberta or British Columbia,
while some others have instead some relatively large provisions (up to 4 months in largest firms,
as in the case of Quebec). For individual EPL, the total length of the notice period varies across
regions and either progress fast or instead remains relatively flat.
Given these information, we develop two strategies to identify the eﬀect of EPL. The first
one is to use information on seniority and firm size and compare individuals within provinces.
The second one is to use regional diﬀerences instead. We now discuss the pros and cons of each
procedure.
3.2.1 Employment protection legislation in provinces
Since seniority and firm size are not available in NHPS and would be endogenous variables, we
first consider using the regional dimension. We build through a simple aggregation procedure
described in Appendix C an aggregate index of regional employment protection for individual
dismissals and another index for employment protection for collective dismissals. Both are ex-
pressed as the expected number of weeks of advance notice but are meant to proxy more complex
dimensions of EPL. Let us denote these regional EPL indices by EPL_ind and EPL_coll. We
checked ex-post that these variables make sense. The EPL indicators are positively correlated
with regional unemployment duration and with other indicators of employment regulations pro-
vided by business surveys. They are also negatively associated with the transition probability
from employment to unemployment–see Technical Appendix C for all details. We can thus be
reasonably confident that advance notice is a good proxy for other forms of EPL and capture
well the fluidity of provincial labor markets.20
19See e.g. Garibaldi (1998) for theory and some data analysis for OECD countries. For Canada, Frisen
(1997) has used the same variations to study the impact of advance notice regional diﬀerences on the duration of
employment and found that longer advance notice both raises the fraction of job-to-job moves and reduces the
hazard rate.
20There is another reason to believe that these indicators make some sense: advance notice requirements initially
reflected the outcome of several local courts decisions before becoming the law– local judges decided that, for a
worker with n years of seniority, a p months notice period was fair – so that diﬀerences across provinces reflect
the philosophy of the provinces towards economic layoﬀs: it is quite likely that other dimensions of EPL are
correlated with the length of advance notice.
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3.2.2 Imputed EPL
As indicated above, running within-region estimates of the eﬀect of EPL is not directly possible
in the absence of information on firm’s size and seniority of individuals in NHPS: tenure can be
constructed from NPHS questionnaire only from cycles 1, 2 and 3, whereas stress is available from
cycles 4 and 5, that is, 2 and 4 years after the last observation of tenure; moreover, employer’s
size is unavailable in NPHS. In addition, these two variables would be very endogenous: an
individual subject to stress might not stay long in firms and might prefer to work in more
protected firms.
We can remedy to both problems using an imputation technique, and approximate the degree
of protection at the individual level. Another dataset, the Canadian Labor Force Survey (LFS
or Enquête sur la Population Active, EPA) contains information on seniority and establishment
size as well as all relevant information such as industry, occupation and demographics. We
used the monthly files for years 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002, that is a total of 60 files,
containing overall slightly more than 3 millions observations, and about 500 000 thousands
diﬀerent individuals (there is a rotating scheme of about 6 months). The dataset contains
information on tenure in months and establishment and firm’s size, as well as a set a variables
denoted by Zit common with the NPHS (region, industry, occupation, gender, age).
From the information on tenure and on the region of individuals in EPA-LFS, we built the
exact number of weeks of advance notice protecting individuals from individual layoﬀ thanks
to the table in Figure B. Similarly, from the information on the establishment’s size, we obtain
the exact number of weeks of advance notice in case of mass layoﬀ. Let us denote these actual
measures of EPL by actEPL_indit and actEPL_collit. We then regress these measures on a set
of regional dummies, sectors and occupation, age (5 years bands), education (14 dummies) and
gender, weighting the regression by the panel weight of EPA-LFS and correcting for clustering
per individuals. The imputation models explain about 45% of the total variance for individual
EPL and about 28% of total variance for collective EPL. We then used the vector of coeﬃcients
to obtain the fitted or imputed values in the NHPS dataset, which we will denoted by EPL_fit
in tables.21
4 Empirical strategy
For a given individual i at time t, the subjective indicators of disutility are denoted by Σit, such
as stress at work; and objective indicators of clinical manifestation of disutility are denoted by
Oit, such as blood pressure, consumption of psychotropic drugs and depression scores.
4.1 Subjective data
Subjective indicators are subject to potential mis-measurement, as self-declared stress may not
reflect the true stress of the job’s environment. For this reason, estimating an equation such as
Σit = α+ βXit + δEPLregion(it) + νit (11)
21We also tried an alternative measure where individuals with temporary contracts are assigned a value of 0
for actEPL. This would only marginally improves the t-stat in the stress regressions (a t-stat of 3.30 typically
becomes 3.32). We decided to keep the benchmark specification.
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in the universe of respondents where νit is an error term of individual i at time t and Xit is
a set of personal characteristics, there are two potential problems: first, whether Σit reflects
the characteristics of the job of individual i or instead its ability to cope with stress. Second,
whether the measurement error in Σit aﬀects the estimate. Denote by ∆it the ’true’ disutility
of workers in the job. We thus have
Σit = ∆it + φit + εit (12)
where εit is the measurement error in the response of individual capturing the heterogenous
propensity to declare stress ; φit is the (in-)ability to cope with stress. Both error terms do not
aﬀect the estimate of δ to the extent that they are uncorrelated with νit, which amounts to the
question of the quality of controls, described in next sub-section.
Another potential problem is the selection issue: workers experiencing more stress may be
likely i) to quit or ii) not to participate to the labor market. Item i) is not a problem here
since our data on stress cover workers having been employed in the year of the survey: even
quitters or non-employed answer the stress questions. Item ii) is not a problem if we postulate
that the relevant universe of the model is the universe of those currently employed: since we are
interested in job characteristics, we are not interested in what could be the stress for jobs that
do not exist: in this interpretation, there is no selection issue.
4.2 Controls
As controls, denoted by Xit, we shall use: sex, 9 age categories, marital status, type of house-
hold, living arrangement of the selected respondent, urban/rural, household size, six weight
categories, highest level of education (14 dummies), whether the individual has immigrated in
the last ten years, whether he has immigrated more than ten years ago (based on age at time
of immigration), country/area of origin (among areas: Canada, Europe, US, South America,
Asia,...), year dummies, 16 sectors and 47 occupation. To control for other characteristics linked
to the ability to cope with stress, we have a number of possible variables in this rich dataset.
For instance, there is a variable reflecting trauma in the childhood of the individuals.22 There
are also variables on the amount of stress experienced in other dimensions than work, so-called
chronic stress23, which we will not use in benchmark regressions but will be useful in the falsifi-
cation exercises. The idea is that these additional controls will remove most of the correlation
between φit and νit. See the full list of controls in the regression tables. A valuable suggestion
to remove individual heterogeneity would be to rely on fixed eﬀects estimators. However, there
is only a tiny fraction of region movers: fixed eﬀects in equation (11) lead to a considerable loss
of eﬃciency.
A last potential control is union density at the provincial level, which may be used as an
additional regressor. The data can be obtained from Statistic Canada. Given a break in the
22“This index measures the number of traumatic events respondents have been exposed to during their child-
hood, adolescence or adulthood. Events included are parental divorce, a lengthy hospital stay, prolonged parental
unemployment, frequent parental alcohol or drug use. A higher score indicates more stressors.”
23“This (trauma) index measures the number of traumatic events respondents have been exposed to during their
childhood, adolescence or adulthood. Events included are parental divorce, a lengthy hospital stay, prolonged
parental unemployment, frequent parental alcohol or drug use. A higher score indicates more stressors.”
The exact definition of chronic stress is: “The stressors include activity overload, financial diﬃculties and
problems with relationships in day-to-day encounters.” and the construction of the index does not include the
’W-stress’ variables, i.e. stress at work.
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series in 1996, we have used an average for 1997-2003 and use that variable in regressions.24
Unfortunately, the individual’s membership status is not available in NHPS.
4.3 Objective data
The questionnaire has a section on quantitative measure of psychological disorders and other
health variables of interest. Contrary to work stress questions available for employees only, the
universe of respondent is the total working age population. This is an interesting feature of the
data since the essence of the test will be to interact the employment status with EPL to control
for regional eﬀects possibly aﬀecting the propensity to consume antidepressants or local genetic
factors aﬀecting, say, blood pressure. In that sense, we can estimate an equation such as
Oit = α+ βXit + δ.EPLregion(it) ∗ empit + γ.empit+ DiRegionit + νit (13)
where Di is a regional fixed eﬀect and Regionit is the region of the individual at time t, and
emp is a dummy variable indicating that the individual surveyed is currently employed. We will
also control for whether the individual is covered by health insurance. An immediate diﬃculty
here is that, in OLS regressions, whatever the variable chosen Oit, the coeﬃcient γ is always
very negatively significant: ceteris paribus, employed individuals have a propensity to cope with
stress that is higher than that of non-employed. Said otherwise, depressed individuals, those
taking psychotropic drugs and those with severe pathology are less likely to be at work. One
way to express this fact is to assume that there is an employment equation, such as
emp∗it = α
0 + β0.Zit + ηit (14)
where the star denotes a latent variable, Zit is a set of variables determining the employment
probability and ηit is an individual noise, likely to be negatively correlated with νit. The set of
variables Zit contains most of variables in Xit (age, gender, family, etc...). As an identification,
we chose to add local labor market conditions, such as the unemployment rate or the activity
rate. Such variables happen to be well correlated with the employment status of the individual
and are not a priori correlated with the individual propensity to suﬀer from any pathology
as it is an aggregate over about 100 000 individuals and is obtained from a distinct survey.
Accordingly, equation (13) will be estimated using IV estimators.25
Appendix B5 discusses several econometric issues linked to individual clustering, regional
clustering and the correction of standard errors when EPL is imputed from the LFS survey.
5 Results
5.1 Sample statistics and correlations
Table 1 displays summary statistics in a sample restricted to the 25-64 y.o. who are not self-
employed. The share of men is slightly below 0.5 ; there are almost 20% of non-native Canadians.
The average age is 43.3 years. In the sample, on a trauma scale of (0-7), the average is 1.06
24From table 279-0025 for 1976-1995: all employees coverage and from table 282-0073 for 1997-2004: full-time
employee coverage. Both come from the Labor Force Surveys.
25About s.e. correction with IV techniques and notably the comparison between Moulton (1986) and robust
methods of estimation with clustering, see page 11 in Hoxby (2005).
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with a standard deviation (s.d.) of 1.23. Almost a quarter of the population is not covered by a
health insurance. The fraction of users of psychotropic drugs (antidepressants, tranquilizers and
sleeping pills) is relatively small (3 to 4%), but there are 2 to 3% of refusals–later on, attempts
to impute a yes to a refusal don’t change the results. A fraction of 8.5% of respondents has used
one of these three medications within the last four weeks. The last four rows give the mean and
s.d. of imputed employment protection, with or without using information on temporary work:
in the last two rows, temporary workers are assumed to have no employment protection and
their associated index is zero. This correction for temporary employment makes little diﬀerence
in sample means, and did almost no change to subsequent regressions.
Figures 2-5 next present a scatter plot of unconditional provincial means of various stress
indicators and provincial EPL. They illustrate the relatively high and positive correlation be-
tween individual employment protection and overall stress, psychological stress and stress from
skill needs. There is a weaker but reinsuringly negative correlation between individual EPL and
the stress associated with job loss. The next key question is whether these correlations or other
survive once various covariates are included, notably individual variables, sectors, occupation
and local labor market conditions as well as collective EPL and unionization.
5.2 Stress regressions
In all stress regressions, the sample is restricted to those having answered the questions on stress
at work, that is, those having worked in the year preceding the survey. We further exclude the
self-employed.
5.2.1 Cross-province identification
Table 2 displays the baseline regression on overall stress at work, where the EPL variables are
those of the region where the individuals currently live. Column 1 is the baseline regression
with sample weights. Column 2 is a random eﬀect regression. Column 3 adds a union density
variable to the baseline specification. Column 4 adds the 1994-95 wave which is subject to the
translation error in the stress questionnaire, as a comparison with column 1. Column 5 adds
342 interactions dummies terms between industry and occupation. All specifications include
gender, age, family, immigration, place of birth, education and year dummies. As expected,
female workers, older workers and workers having experienced traumatic events when they were
young report higher stress at work. Notably, the ’trauma in the past’ variable is remarkably
significant and will be kept in most regressions where they are relevant.
In all specifications, it appears that both types of EPL (individual and collective) raise total
stress at work. Individual EPL is the most significant variable of the two, whereas collective
EPL is only marginally significant. Adding the union rate in the specification marginally raises
the significance of collective EPL but reduces the coeﬃcient of individual EPL. Including 342 in-
teraction dummies (occupation times industry) reduces the coeﬃcients of EPL, but they remain
significant. The inclusion of the first wave (1994-95) reduces the significance of the coeﬃcients.
How large are the eﬀects? In the baseline equation, moving from the level of EPL of New
Foundland to the one of British Columbia (from 2 to 5) would raise stress by 0.6 units, when
the standard deviation of stress is 4.33: 14% of one s.d. of stress can be explained by individual
EPL, while another 0.2 units of stress are accounted for by collective EPL when it goes from
the level of Alberta to the level of Quebec, that is, another 5% of one standard deviation. It
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looks small but this is an average eﬀect for all stress dimensions. Sub-components of stress will
be shown to be quantitatively much more aﬀected by EPL.
5.2.2 Imputation of EPL and within-region estimates
The alternative estimation strategy discussed above is to impute actual employment protection
to individuals, as described in Section 3.2.2, using for this purpose various years of the Canadian
labor force survey (EPA-LFS). Results are displayed in Table 3. Generally speaking, the esti-
mates obtained through this method are marginally smaller and slightly less significant: t-stat
of EPL_ind_fit are around 3.0 instead of 3.3, while coeﬃcients go from 0.24 to 0.19. Note
here that we do not need to implement Moulton’s correction or regional clustering correction
since the explanatory variable is no longer constant within regions.
The imputation method makes it possible to include regional eﬀects in the econometric
specification. In such specifications, we found that EPL variables are no longer significant. In
contrast, if we run the benchmark specification with the imputed EPL in removing industry
dummies and occupation dummies (both being the main determinant of imputed EPL) and
without regional dummies, we obtain positive coeﬃcients with t-stat of 6.85 and 1.63 respectively
for individual and collective EPL. Now adding regional dummies but still in the absence of
industry and occupation dummies leads to EPL to have a t-stat of 4.76 and 3.70. This suggests
that the impact of EPL on stress is actually both between regions and within regions but between
industries and occupations. Once region, industry and occupation eﬀects are added, nothing is
left of the correlation.
5.2.3 Regional vs. individual clustering
To address the multilevel clustering issue (individual+regional), Table 4 re-runs the benchmark
regression for specific years. Interestingly, controlling for regional clustering in cross-sections es-
timates raise standard errors (especially in 2000), indicating that the correlation within provinces
is negative rather than positive.26
We can also note the stability of coeﬃcients across years. This confirms that most of the
results are driven by the cross-section. Unreported between-estimators regressions in the pooled
cross-sections bring the same results, while fixed-eﬀects estimators lead to insignificant coef-
ficients of EPL. Finally, Hausman tests on random eﬀects, which tests for coeﬃcients being
diﬀerent between random eﬀects and between-estimators regressions actually show mixed re-
sults: sometimes the null is rejected, sometimes not.
In the last column of Table 4, we also tried Wooldridge’s (2003, Sn III) suggestion to proceed
in two steps: first, regress the stress indicator on all variables which are not clustered and a set
of regional dummy indicators (denoted by δk, k = 1, ..., 10). Then, to regress the fixed eﬀects
themselves on the two variables EPL_ind and EPL_coll. We obtained the following coeﬃcients
respectively: 0.2007 (2.40) and 0.0342 (1.83) respectively, and a R2 and adj−R2 of 0.53 and 0.38.
The t-stat in parenthesis correspond to significance levels in the t10−2 distribution which are
respectively: 2.2% and 5.3%. To sum up, regional clustering is not a major issue here especially
26An interpretation is that provinces are large and diverse. They notably have both rural and urban areas
which dramatically diﬀer in the perception of stress, while the urbanicity variable we have is only a 0/1 indicator
thus possibly insuﬃcient.
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after accounting for individual clustering and hereafter, we exclusively focus on robust estimates
with individual clustering.27
5.3 Various components of stress and job’s characteristics
Table 5 investigates the impact of EPL on the various components of stress at work. In the first
specification displayed in the top part of the table, we have the same controls as in Table 2,
column 1. We find that individual EPL increases psychological stress, reduces the stress from
layoﬀ, raises physical stress and stress from strain. The eﬀect of collective EPL is more balanced
as it sometimes reduces stress (physical exertion, psychological and strain) but raises the stress
from layoﬀ. However, this last result appears to be due to a lack of controls. This is why we
replicate all regressions in adding the union density variable, as displayed in the bottom panel of
the table. The positive eﬀect of collective EPL on stress from layoﬀ is now no longer significant.
We also find that unions raise the stress from layoﬀ. This may be due to unions succeeding in
raising wages but at the cost of increasing job fragility.
We now have an explanation for why the eﬀect of EPL on total stress at work is positive
and not negative: in the total stress indicator, job insecurity is given a quite small weight. Job
insecurity has a range (0,4) whereas total stress at work ranges from 0 to 48. If one arbitrarily
increased the weight of job insecurity, the sum of all dimensions of stress could actually be
negatively correlated with EPL. The positive coeﬃcient of EPL is thus partly the outcome of a
normalization chosen by the team of sociologists having derived, totally independently of this
work, the various stress variables.
Given these rich data, other specifications are possible. An interesting idea would be, for
instance, to use stress from job insecurity as an individual proxy for the eﬀective degree of
employment protection faced by the individual. However, this variable is correlated both to
employment protection–the direct eﬀect we wish to measure– and to the economic conditions
of the firm. And we know from the theory part that the non-viability of the job is a key
determinant of pressures from management, hence the interpretation the eﬀect of job insecurity
on other dimensions of stress is unclear: from theory, the sign can be both ways.
Finally, we return to the 13 base questions used to generate the stress variables and replicate
the same analysis with these questions. Since the answers take discrete values in (1,5), we run
an ordered logit estimates unless they do not converge, in which case we run linear regressions
despite biased standard errors. We have the same list of controls as in Table 2. Results are
in Table 6. The title of each column gives a summary of the question and the table reads as
follows: a positive coeﬃcient in column 1 for instance means that it is more likely that “No
learning required”. Focussing on the eﬀect of individual EPL, we find that it is associated with
more hectic jobs, more conflicting demands, more hostility and the supervisor is (with marginal
significance) less helpful, but there is no systematic relation with job satisfaction neither job
security. The second line indicates that high EPL_coll jobs have less learning, are low skill
27Table B3 in Appendix adds several controls, many of which turn out to be significant: health status (self-
perceived), social support (self-perceived), body weight, language (french speakers are not significantly diﬀerence
from the reference group, English speakers, but other groups are less stressed). Local unemployment (in one of
the 382 geographical Census divisions) reduces slightly both the coeﬃcient on EPL and its significance. Other
local controls do not change the broad picture. A “chronic stress” variable, i.e. stress in other dimensions than
work, shows up to be extremely significant. One interpretation is that the ability to cope with stress depends
very much on other sources of stress. Table B4 in Appendix investigates further the role of local conditions, in
adding interaction terms between local unemployment and EPL, with mixed results.
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jobs, there is little freedom, they are not repetitive, they are not hectic, have no particular
physical exertion, but there is a quite high level of hostility, the supervisor is not helpful and
workers, very significantly, don’t receive much help in getting the job done. Interestingly, there
is no correlation between EPL and job satisfaction, as the last column (bottom panel) indicates.
5.4 Elements of falsification
An obvious question at this stage is whether the identification strategy based on provincial
diﬀerences in 10 regions is valid. Could it be simply by accident that we found a positive
correlation between EPL and stress? Part of our confidence in the results comes from the large
list of controls: have we introduced enough individual’s characteristics: this reduces the risk that
the correlation is due to unobserved factors. Further, the negative sign of EPL on stress is an
indicator that the EPL variables makes sense.
Here, we propose additional elements of falsification, as follows: are there dimensions of
stress unrelated to work that are indeed uncorrelated with EPL? This is precisely what Table
7 does. We regress three components of stress a priori unrelated to work on EPL and the
same individual characteristics as in Table 2. We do so in the same sample of employed workers.
These alternative stress dimensions are “chronic stress”, adding up stress in all dimensions except
stress at work, stress associated with personal life and finally stress associated with financial
problems. We would expect the coeﬃcients of EPL to be now insignificant and the coeﬃcients
to be smaller. As columns 1 to 3 indicate, this is indeed the case for EPL_ind: t-statistics
are reduced from 3.5 to 2.1 or even 1.3. For EPL_coll, the falsification is even stronger since
coeﬃcients turn negative in some case with marginal significance.
The residual positive correlation between EPL_ind and the “stress of work” variables can
actually be explained: the ability to cope with stress in one’s dimension of life is aﬀected by
stress in other dimensions: a seemingly innocuous event in the family could become stressful if
the job is already stressful. Columns 4 to 6, where stress at work is added among the regressors,
is consistent with this interpretation: it is highly significant, and all positive coeﬃcients of
EPL_ind become insignificant. The falsification exercise is thus relatively coherent: there is
little chance that the impact of EPL on stress at work is obtained by chance, or because workers
in high EPL regions are structurally more stressed people. It is more likely that this eﬀect is
related to management techniques and industrial relations, as suggested in the theory part.
5.5 Psychotropic drugs and depression
Even though the imputation and the various falsification regressions suggest that the positive
link between individual EPL and stress is not spurious, one may want to use the additional
information on health conditions of individuals, the so-called objective measures, to confirm our
findings. Indeed, as shown in Table B5 in Appendix, there is a strong positive link between
general stress and depression.28 This is sometimes referred too as a burnout eﬀect: workers have
a stock of energy that becomes depleted after a while
28Specifications with chronic stress as a variable are available only for waves 1, 4 and 5 (18 000 obs.), while
specification without this variable are available for all five waves (33 000 obs.). We find that the correlation
between current stress and depression scores (and probability) is very large. Trauma and female gender are also
very strongly positively associated with depression. Local conditions, in contrast, do not appear to play a major
role.
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Equation (13) can be thought as a depression equation, where we use as regressors the interac-
tion between being employed and provincial EPL. As detailed above, we need instruments: local
labor market conditions and household size interacted with gender work fairly well, as shown
in Table 8. Local unemployment is largely negatively associated with individual employment,
while local activity rates raise individual’s probability of being employed.
Table 9 must be read two columns by two columns, where we systematically compares the
regular probit regressions and their IV-probit counterparts. The successive variables on the left
hand-side are: a depression indicator, the consumption of one of the psychotropic drugs discussed
in Section 3.1.4, and an indicator for abnormally high blood pressure. The null of exogeneity
of instruments fails to be rejected at conventional significance levels. The presence or absence
of coverage by an health insurance is added among regressors. For the depression indicator,
antidepressants and tranquilizers, we find here evidence of a slight causal role of individual
EPL. We found no eﬀect on blood pressure.
6 Concluding comments
Does EPL improve the well-being of employed workers? In this paper, we have developed a
model in which stress and strain at work depend on EPL according to an inverted U-shape
pattern (positive for low EPL levels, negative for high EPL levels, and in particular negative for
non-viable jobs). The theory is not rejected by the data analysis: we even find positive eﬀects of
EPL on some dimensions of stress. We also found weaker but positive links between depression
of employed workers and EPL, and similar links between the use of some psychotropic drugs
among employed workers and EPL.
This is a provocative idea which the data do not seem to reject. This is however only a
starting point. Future work should notably investigate the relation between EPL and stress in
other countries. The United States are a good candidate, since a number of works have been
done here on wrongful discharge laws introduced in the 1970’s or 1980’s (e.g. Autor et al. 2006).
Unfortunately, rare are the datasets where stress at work can be measured in the US: there are
such surveys for the post 2002 period, at a time where there is little or no variation in EPL
across US states. At best, we could replicate our cross-sectional empirical strategy for those
year, which is our next task.
More generally, the hypothesis could be tested in virtually all countries, as long as data on
stress are collected and that there is a source of exogenous variation in EPL. Another way to
approach the same set of questions is to focus on firm’s data. For instance, it may be interesting
to find evidence of variations in the quality of industrial relations, size of firms, human resources
management, that would be correlated with the stringency of EPL.
As a final remark, it is important to have a better understanding of the unexpected negative
eﬀects of EPL on workers wellbeing. This may open the way to labor market reforms in several
European countries. Many observers appear to agree that EPL harms outsiders (unemployed,
female, and young workers), but if in addition it can be established that it aﬀects groups of
workers closer to the political core (protected workers), the terms of the debate drastically
change, which implies even more scope for reform.
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Appendix
A Model appendix
A.1 Summary of notations
See Table A.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof amounts to calculating the cut-oﬀ values of ε for which NF∼F, NF∼C and F∼C. The first
and third values correspond to bε and ε, while the second one is a shadow margin ε= ε− τ > bε and ε> bε.
Indeed, for ε > bε, FÂNF ; for ε >ε, CÂNF and for ε > ε, CÂF. Then, to sum up, if ε < bε, NFÂFÂC
and the firm prefers NF ; if bε < ε <ε, FÂNFÂC and the firm prefer F ; if ε< ε < ε, FÂCÂNF and the
firm still prefer F ; if ε > ε, CÂFÂNF and the firms prefers to continue with the worker.
A.3 General case
Workers knows its eﬀort leads to changing margins and F , as follows:
∂F
∂e
= −qmF 0 < 0; (A1)
∂ε
∂e
= 0 ;
∂bε
∂e
= τqmΦ > 0;
∂ν
∂e
= 0 ;
∂bν
∂e
= −ΣΦ < 0.
where Φ = F 0/(1− F )2. Note the interesting simpler case where
F (x) =
Kx
1−Kx with F (0) = 0 and Kx < 1
leads to a constant Φ = K, where x = qm(e− e). Similarly, we have that
∂F
∂qm
= (e− e)F 0 > 0; (A2)
∂ε
∂qm
= 0 ;
∂bε
∂qm
= −τ(e− e)Φ < 0;
∂ν
∂qm
= 0 ;
∂bν
∂qm
= Σ(e− e)Φ;
∂ε
∂qw
=
∂bε
∂qw
= 0 ;
∂bν
∂qw
=
∂ν
∂qw
= −1.
Denote by νe the unconditional mean of ν and by | the conditioning operator. The program of the
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worker can be decomposed as follows:
Max
e
U = w − c(e) + qw − qm + νe
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
First period utility
+ G(bε)(U + ατ)
←−−−−−−−−→
Firm initiates a no-fault layoﬀ , worker does not quit
(A3)
+ (G(ε)−G(bε))
←−−−−−−−−→
×
Firm initiates a layoﬀ for fault⎧
⎨
⎩ H(bν)U←−−−→
Worker quits
+ (1−H(bν))
←−−−−−−→
Worker does not quit
[ UF←→
Procedure succeeds
+ (1− F )(w + qw + νe|ν>?ν − c(e))←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Procedure fails
− Σ
Stress
]
⎫
⎬
⎭
+ (1−G(ε))
←−−−−−→
Firm wishes to retain the worker
⎧
⎨
⎩ H(ν)U←−−−→
Worker quits
+ (1−H(ν))(w + qw + νe|ν>ν − C(e))←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Worker does not quit
⎫
⎬
⎭ .
Denote by εe the unconditional mean of ε. The first order conditions on monitoring qm and working
conditions qw can be decomposed in a similar way. The program of the firm is
Max
qm,qw
Π = εe + e− w − C(qm, qw)
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
first period profits
+G(bε)(π − τ) (A4)
+ (G(ε)−G(bε))
←−−−−−−−−→
Firm initiate a layoﬀ for fault
×
⎧
⎨
⎩ H(bν)π←−−→
Worker quits
+ (1−H(bν))
←−−−−−−→
Worker does not quit
[ Fπ←→
Procedure succeeds
+ (1− F )(εe|ε>ε>?ε + e− w)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Procedure fails
]
⎫
⎬
⎭
+ (1−G(ε))
←−−−−−→
Firm wish to retain the worker
⎧
⎨
⎩ H(ν)π←−−→
Worker quits
+ (1−H(ν))(εe|ε<ε + e− w)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Worker does not quit
⎫
⎬
⎭ .
Rewrite and simplify the program of the worker in introducing the notations ν and bν:
Max
e
U = w − c(e) + qw − qm + νe + U +G(bε)ατ
+ [G(ε)−G(bε)]× [1−H(bν)](1− F )(νe|ν>?ν − bν)
+ [1−G(ε)][1−H(ν)](νe|ν>ν − ν).
while on the firm’s side, introducing
Max
qm,qw
Π = εe + e− w − C(qm, qw) + π +G(bε)(−τ)
+ [G(ε)−G(bε)]× [1−H(bν)](1− F )(εe|ε>ε>?ε − ε)
+ [1−G(ε)](1−H(ν))(εe|ε<ε − ε).
When ε follows a uniform distribution with density g0 = (εmax − εmin)−1, we have
G(ε)−G(bε) = g0τ
1− F
1−G(ε) = g0(εmax − ε)
G (bε) = g0(bε− εmin)
εe|ε>ε>?ε − ε = bε− ε
2
= − τ
2(1− F )
εe|ε<ε − ε = εmax − ε
2
27
which further simplifies the expressions above, as
Max
e
U = w − c(e) + qw − qm + νe + U + g0(bε− εmin)ατ (A5)
+ g0τ [1−H(bν)](νe|ν>?ν − bν) + g0(εmax − ε)[1−H(ν)](νe|ν>ν − ν).
Max
qm,qw
Π = εe + e− w − C(qm, qw) + π + g0(bε− εmin)(−τ) (A6)
+ g0τ [1−H(bν)]µbε− ε
2
¶
+ g0(εmax − ε)[1−H(ν)]
µ
εmax − ε
2
¶
.
A.4 Case of fixed ν: proofs
In that case, denote by ν0 the single value of utility, we assume ν0 such thatH(bν) = 0 and H(ν) = 0 (no
quit). Thus, from (A5), we obtain
c0(e)
marginal cost
= g0
µ
∂bε
∂e
¶
ατ − g0τ
µ
∂bν
∂e
¶
(A7)
or c0(e) =
∂bε
∂e
g0(ατ +Σ) = Φqmg0τ(ατ + Σ). (A8)
On the worker’s side, the first order condition in Appendix equation (A7) states that the marginal cost of
eﬀort C0(e) equals the sum of two terms, one proportional to ∂bε/∂e reflecting by how much the marginal
eﬀort reduces the propensity of the firm to use a F-layoﬀ procedure instead of a NF-layoﬀ procedure, and
a second term proportional to ∂F/∂e, reflecting by how much, in case the F-procedure is being used, the
worker reduces its success rate F .
Assuming F
0
(1−F )2 = Φ, we obtain equation (A8): eﬀort increases in the intensity of monitoring and in
the square root of non-fault layoﬀ cost τ , for two reasons. First, when α > 0, workers obtain a severance
payment which induce them to work more in order to avoid the firm to undertake a F-layoﬀ procedure.
And second, the layoﬀ-elasticity of the response by the firm to a change in e, reflected by ∂bε/∂e, is higher,
the higher τ , as the incentive of firms to undertake a F-layoﬀ is higher.
On the firm’s side, the first order condition on qw is simple:
∂C(q)/∂qw = 0,
which means that, in the absence of quits, firms have no incentive to aﬀect working conditions in one
way (positively) or the other (i.e. negatively). As regards to the eﬀect of qm on profits, we have:
∂C(q)/∂qm = −g0τ
∂bε
∂qm
+
g0τ
2
∂bε
∂qm
(A9)
or ∂C(q)/∂qm = g0τ2(e− e)Φ. (A10)
The first order condition A9 shows that, the higher the eﬀort of the worker, the lower the rate of return
on monitoring. Further assuming F
0
(1−F )2 = Φ, we obtain equation (A10). Firing costs τ raise the return
on monitoring for firm because a higher qm at a given e makes the F-layoﬀ option more secure.
Finally, a Nash equilibrium exists and is unique by intersection of the downward sloping curve (A10)
and the upward sloping curve (A8).
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A.5 Other cases: ν uniform
When ν follows a uniform distribution with density h0 = (νmax − νmin)−1, we have
H(ν)−H(bν) = − h0Σ
1− F
1−H(ν) = h0(νmax − ν)
1−H (bν) = h0(νmax − bν)
νe|ν>ν − ν = νmax − ν
2
νe|ν>?ν − bν = νmax − bν
2
leading to further simplifications of (A5) and (A6), as follows:
Max
e
U = w − c(e) + qw − qm + νe + U + g0(bε− εmin)ατ (A11)
+ τ
g0h0
2
(νmax − bν)2 + g0h0
2
(εmax − ε)(νmax − ν)2.
Max
qm,qw
Π = εe + e− w − C(qm, qw) + π + g0(bε− εmin)(−τ) (A12)
+ τg0h0(νmax − bν)µbε− ε
2
¶
+
g0h0
2
(εmax − ε)2(νmax − ν).
First order conditions immediately follow:
c0(e) = ατg0
µ
∂bε
∂e
¶
+ τg0h0(νmax − bν)µ−∂bν∂e
¶
(A13)
∂C/∂qm = C0qm = (−τ)g0
µ
∂bε
∂qm
¶
+
τg0
2
(1−H(bν))µ ∂bε
∂qm
¶
(A14)
+
τh0
2
(1−G(bε))µ− ∂bν
∂qm
¶
∂C/∂qw = C0qw =
τh0
2
(1−G(bε))µ− ∂bν
∂qw
¶
+
h0
2
(1−G(ε)(εmax − ε)
µ
− ∂ν
∂qw
¶
(A15)
Replacing derivatives of bν and bε from (A1) and (A2), we obtain equations (8), (9) and (10) in the text.
B Data Appendix
Number of longitudinal panel members: 17,276 ; Number of panel members who have died: 1,279 ;
Number of panel members who have been institutionalized: 161 ; Number of respondent panel members:
12,484 ; Number of non-respondent panel members: 3,352. A full description of the survey can be found
here: http://www.statcan.ca/cgi-bin/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS
=3225&lang=en&db=IMDB&dbg=f&adm=8&dis=2, or simply in finding the website in googling
NHPS Canada.
B.1 Response and attrition
B.1.1 Response rates
In this specific case of a health survey, non-response is a particular concern. The appendix (Table B2)
thus provides various details on death, attrition and non-response. In short, the response rate varies
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between 80 and 92%. Conditional on being a respondent, the refusal to reply to individual questions,
including those on drug consumption, is generally around 2% or less. The next table provides some
overview of these problems. Further, according to the documentation, ”the income variables have refusal
rates of close to 4%. Some of the labour force submodules and the mastery submodule (stress module)
have the highest refusal rates at 0.11% and 0.12% respectively”. In other words, people are sometime
reluctant to talk about money, but seem unconcerned about talking about stress.
B.1.2 Attrition rates
Attrition is a loss in sample size due to non-respondents i.e. refusals, no-contacts, unable to trace cases,
etc. Note that decease respondents are not considered part of attrition for the NPHS longitudinal sample.
The cumulative attrition rate is presented for each cycle. Each attrition rate is calculated using the
number of individuals found in the Full subset of respondents i.e. those who completed the questionnaire
in all cycles. The main cause of attrition is due to an increasing number of respondents who refuse to
continue to participate to the survey. Cycle Attrition rate. Cycle 2 : 9.3%. Cycle 3 : 15.4%. Cycle 4 :
21.4%. Cycle 5 : 27.4%
B.2 Weighting
”Weight WT64LS is called the “square weight” and applies to the 17,276 members that make up the
original longitudinal sample. All non-response should be taken into account for any calculation. Weight
WT62LF is called the “Longitudinal Full” weight and applies to the 12,546 records that are included
in the “Full” subset of respondents. Weight WT62LFE is called the “Longitudinal Full C1 and C5”
weight and applies to the 13,629 records that are included in the “Full C1 and C5” subset of respondents.
Weight WT62SLF is called “Longitudinal Full Share” weight and applies to the 12,226 respondents that
are included in the “Full Share” subset of respondents.” Source. Longitudinal Documentation, Cycle 5.
B.3 Confidentiality
“Confidentiality concerns preclude general dissemination of longitudinal NPHS data in public use micro-
data file (PUMF) format. However, access to all the longitudinal master microdata files including the
Cycle 4 and Cycle 5 data (as well as access to the cross-sectional master microdata files, which exist
for the first three cycles of the NPHS) is available through Statistics Canada’s Research Data Centres
(RDCs) program. (...) RDCs provide researchers with access, in a secure university setting, to micro-
data from population and household surveys. The centres are staﬀed by Statistics Canada employees.
They are operated under the provisions of the Statistics Act in accordance with all the confidentiality
rules and are accessible only to researchers with approved projects who have been sworn in as ”deemed
employees”. RDCs are located throughout the country, so researchers do not need to travel to Ottawa to
access Statistics Canada microdata. More information is available at the Research Data Centre Program
web site: http://www.statcan.ca/english/rdc/index.htm.
A second option, if the RDCs are not accessible for the researcher, is Health Statistics Division’s
Remote Access service. This service provides researchers with a means to develop and test their own
computer programs using synthetic files that mimic the actual master files. Researchers then submit
their programs to a dedicated e-mail address. The programs are run against the master microdata files
on an internal secure server, outputs are vetted for confidentiality, and sent back to the researcher by
return e-mail. For more information on this service, please contact the Data Access team at nphs-
ensp@statcan.ca.”
B.4 Match with local labor markets
The NPHS survey includes detailed geographical variables: region of residence, census divisions, census
sub-divisions and zip code. we matched the census divisions defining 382 local areas of size approximately
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80 000 persons to variables extracted from the 1996 and 2001 census: local unemployment rate; local
activity rate ; local density of population ; local share of male in the population ; and the growth rate
of population between 1996 and 2001. Except for the last variables, we attributed the values of the 1996
Census to Cycle 1 and 2 ; the values of the 2001 Census to Cycles 4 and 5 ; and the mean of the two
Census for Cycle 3. Future work will attempt to match individuals with the exact longitude and latitude.
B.5 Clustering and s.e. corrections
B.5.1 Individual clustering
In both the ”subjective variable” approach and the ”objective variable” approach, we have various prob-
lems with the covariance structure of error terms that must be discussed and solved. The first problem
is that the panel structure of individuals leads to individual clustering, that is usually accounted for by
within-panel clustering or random eﬀects models. In general and unless specified, we use the Huber-White
sandwich robust estimators augmented to account of cluster correlation.
B.5.2 Regional clustering
Since we use a provincial indicators of employment protection, the correlation of error terms within
provinces may bias the s.e. of OLS estimates (Moulton 1986, 1987 and 1990, Moulton and Randolph
1989). See also technical Appendix 3 for a description of the covariance structure. We will use a
pragmatic approach here: instead of programming a multi-level correction for clustering which turns out
to be computationally too demanding at this stage29 , we will present, in a robustness sub-section, the
results of regional clustering correction30 in the two cross-sections available (2000 and 2002) and show
that, overall, the within-region correlation in error terms does not appear to be a big problem.
B.5.3 Correction of s.e. after imputation
The imputation approach, whereby, in some robustness regressions, the level of EPL of a given individual
is generated from another dataset, increases the variance of the explanatory variables but generates per
se a number of additional issues: indeed, we now have two sources of randomness: error terms in equation
(11) and error in the fitted variable. A standard method discussed in Little and Rubin (1987, chapter
12) is to bootstrap (here, 20 times) the imputation and estimate 20 times equation (11). The coeﬃcients
and s.e. are a weighted average of each individual estimate. All displayed t-stats of regressions using
generated regressors are corrected according to their formula (see Appendix D.2). The same correction
of standard errors will be applied to equation (13).
References
[1] Akerstedt, T., Knutsson, A., Westerholm, P., Theorell T., Alfredsson, L. and Keclung, G., J. (2002).
“Sleep disturbances, work stress and work hours: a cross-sectional study”, J. Psychosom. Res.,
Sept.:53(3), pp. 741-748
29See also Bertrand et al. (2004) on how to account for both intra-class and serial correlation, and Angrist
and Lavy (2002) on the role of small number of clusters on the correction of s.e. It may be fruitful to rotate the
various dimensions (time, states) of these diﬀ-in-diﬀ approaches to obtain a similar problem with intra-states and
intra-individuals correlation in error terms.
30See Hoxby (2005), pp. 8-12 for a detailed discussion of the pros and cons of programming Moulton’s (1986)
corrected s.e. vs. the Stata robust cluster corrected standard errors. In short, while Moulton’s strategy is more
eﬃcient in that it impose more structure to the covariance structure of error terms, it is less robust to additional
forms of intraclass correlation. In large provinces such as in Canada, where moreover population density is
extremely heterogeneous, it is probably better to be more flexible in terms of intraclass correlation.
31
[2] Autor, David H., John J. Donohue III and Stewart J. Schwab (2006). “The Costs of Wrongful-
Discharge Laws”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, May, 88(2), pp. 211-231.
[3] Allen, Steven, G. (1981). “An Empirical Model of Work Attendance”, The Review of Economics and
Statistics, Vol. 63, No1 (Feb.), pp. 77-87.
[4] Alonso, J., Angermeyer C., Bernert S., Bruﬀaerts, R., Brugha, T.S”, Bryson, H., de Girolamo, de
Graaf, R., Demyttenaere, K., Gasquet, I., Haro, J.M., Katz, S.J., Kessler, R.C., Kovess, V., Lépine,
J.P., Ormel, J., Polidori, G., Russo, L.J., Vilagut, J. et al. (2004). “Psychotropic drug utilization
in Europe: results from the European Study of the Epidemiology of Mental Disorders (ESEMeD)
project”, Acta Psychatrica Scandinavia 2004:109 (Suppl. 420), PP. 55-64
[5] Angrist, Joshua D. and Victor Lavy. (2002). “The Eﬀect of High School Matriculation Awards:
Evidence from Randomized Trials”, NBER working paper 9389
[6] Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo and Sendhil Mullainathan; “How Much Should We Trust
Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences Estimates?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004, 119(1), pp. 249-75.
[7] Blanchard, Olivier. J. and Philippon, Thomas. (2004). “The Quality of Labor Relations and Unem-
ployment”, NBEr wp 10590
[8] Blanchard, Olivier. J. and Philippon, Thomas. (2006). “Trust, Strikes and Unemployment”, mimeo,
MIT
[9] Burda, M. (1992), ”A Note on Firing Costs and Severance Benefits in Equilibrium Unemployment”
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 94, pp. 479-89.
[10] Clark, Andrew and Postel-Vinay, Fabien. (2005). “Job Security and Job Protection”, mimeo PSE-
Jourdan
[11] Clemens, Jason, Karabegovic, Amela and Veldhuis Niels. (2003). “Measuring Labour Markets in
Canada and the United States, 2003 Edition”, a report of the Fraser Institute, August.
[12] Deloﬀre, Alexandre and Rioux, Laurence. (2004). “Do workers correctly evaluate their job security?
A European comparison”, mimeo, CERC
[13] DREES (Elise Amar and Didier Balsan). “Les ventes d’anti-dépresseurs entre 1980 et 2001”, wp.
DREE 36, Oct. 2003.
[14] Frese, Michael. (1985). “Stress at work and psychosomatic complaints: A causal interpretation”,
Journal of Applied Psychology, May, Vol. 70(2), pp.314-328.
[15] Friesen, Jane. (1997). “Mandatory Notice and the Jobless Durations of Displaced Workers”, Indus-
trial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 50, No 4., July, pp. 652-666
[16] Friesen, Jane, Kuhn, Peter, et al. (1997). “Jobs and Labour Market Policy: A Strategic Scan of
International Research”, report for the Human Resources Directorate, Gov. of Canada
[17] Galdòn-Sànchez, José E. and Güell, Maia, (2003). “Dismissal conflicts and unemployment”, Euro-
pean Economic Review 47, pp. 323-335.
[18] Garibaldi, Pietro. (1998). “Job Flow Dynamics and Firing Restrictions”, European Economic Review,
Vol. 42 Num 2., pp. 245-75.
[19] Hamermesh, Daniel S. (2004). “Subjective Outcomes in Economics”, NBER wp. 10361, forthcoming,
Southern Economic Journal.
[20] Hoxby, Caroline (2005). “Competition among public schools: a reply to Rothstein (2004)”, NBER
w.p. 11216, March.
[21] Lazear, Edward P. (1990). “Job Security Provisions and Employment", Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 105:3, pp. 699-726
32
[22] Lépine, J.P., Gastpar, M., Mendlewicz, J. and Tylee, A. (1997). “Depression in the Community:
the first pan-European study DEPRES (Depression Research in European Society), Int. Clinical
Psychopharmacology, Jan: 12(1), pp. 19-29
[23] Little, R.J.A. and Rubin, D.B. (1987). Statistical Analysis with Missing Data. New York: John
Wiley.
[24] Mortensen, Dale T. and Christopher A. Pissarides (1999). “Job Reallocation, Employment Fluc-
tuations and Unemployment”, Handbook of Macroeconomics„ J. Taylor and M. Woodford (eds.)
Amsterdam,: North-Holland.
[25] Moulton, Brent R., “Random group eﬀects and the precision of regression estimates”, Journal of
Econometrics, Volume 32, Issue 3, August 1986, Pages 385-397
[26] Moulton, Brent R., 1987. “Diagnostics for Group Eﬀects in Regression Analysis,” Journal of Business
& Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 5(2), pages 275-82.
[27] Moulton, Brent R., “An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Eﬀects of Aggregate Variables on
Micro Units”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 72, No. 2 (May, 1990), pp. 334-338
[28] Moulton, Brent R. & Randolph, William C, 1989. “Alternative Tests of the Error Components
Model” Econometrica, vol. 57(3), pages 685-93.
[29] Murphy, K. and R. Topel (1985), “Estimation and inference in two step econometric models”, Journal
of Business and Economic Statistics 3, 370—379.
[30] Pepper, John V. “Robust inferences from random clustered samples: an application using data from
the panel study of income dynamics”, Economics Letters Volume 75, Issue 3 , May 2002, Pages
341-345
[31] Postel-Vinay, Fabien and Saint-Martin, Anne. (2004). “Comment les salariés perçoivent la protection
de l’emploi...”, forthcoming, Economie et Statistiques.
[32] Kugler, Adriana and Saint-Paul, Gilles.(2004). “How Do Firing Costs Aﬀect Worker Flows in a Word
with Adverse Selection”, Journal of Labor Economics, 22:3, pp. 553-584
[33] Seiler-Van Daal B. (2000). “Evaluation du harcèlement moral (enquête dans une population de 1210
salariés et exploitation dans le but de construire un outil de dépistage)”, Thèse de Doctorat en
Médecine, Strasbourg.
[34] Shapiro M. and Stiglitz Joseph. (1984). “Unemployment as a Monitoring Device“, American Eco-
nomic Review, 74 (1984) June, pp. 433-44
[35] Wasmer, E. (2006). “General vs. Specific Skills in Labor Markets with Search Frictions and Firing
Costs”, American Economic Review, June, Volume 96(3), pp 811-831.
[36] Wooldridge, Jeﬀrey M. “Cluster-Sample Methods in Applied Econometrics,” American Economic
Review 93(2), 133-138, papers and proceedings, May 2003.
[37] Wooldridge, Jeﬀrey M. Econometric Analysis of Cross-Section and Panel Data, MIT Press, 2002.
33
Table 1. Various sample statistics
Mean s.d.
Male 49.7
Immigrants 19.6
Urban area 81.4
Age (μ) 43.3 (10.9)
Household size (μ) 3.06 (1.39)
Primary education 17.8
Secondary education 15.5
Some post seconsdary education. 26.6
Tertiary 40.7
Trauma (0-7) 1.06 (1.23)
No medical insurance 0.23
Psychotropic drugs yes no missing
1.Tranquilizer 0.030 0.947 0.030
2.Anti-depressant 0.047 0.930 0.023
3.Sleeping pill 0.034 0.943 0.026
Yes to one psychotropic drug 0.085
Other variables mean sd.
Depression (score, 0-8) 0.38 (1.44)
Depression (proba, 0-1) 0.058 (0.22)
Blood pressure 0.095 (0.29)
Overall (0-48) 10.42 (4.33)
Stress from skill requirement (0-12) 4.78 (2.20)
Stress from decision lattitude (0-8) 2.53 (1.64)
Stress from psychological demands (0-8) 4.52 (1.71)
Stress from physical exertion (0-4) 1.84 (1.22)
Stress from job insecurity (0-4) 1.24 (0.96)
Stress from supervisor or coworkers (0-12) 4.12 (1.29)
Stress from job strain strain (0.2-5) 0.95 (0.31)
Imputed EPL variables (from EPA-LFS) mean sd.
EPL_ind 4.18 (2.88)
EPL_coll 6.14 (4.60)
EPL_ind (a) 4.06 (2.96)
EPL_coll(a) 5.80 (4.65)
(a): accounting for the information on whether the employed indiv idual was under a temporary contract and attributing no advance
notice in th is case.
34
Table 2. Baseline regressions for overall stress
Estimation robust LS R.E. adds union adds cycle 1 adds Ind.*Occ.
Dep. variable: stress_wrk
EPL_ind 0.243 0.176 0.222 0.174 0.193
(3.2)*** (3.3)*** (2.9)*** (2.7)*** (2.4)**
[3.7]*** [3.3]*** [3.2]*** [2.7]***
EPL_coll 0.023 0.021 0.025 0.023 0.018
(1.5) (1.9)* (1.6) (1.8)* (1.2)
[1.8]* [1.8]* [2.2]** [1.3]
Trauma 0.300 0.284 0.300 0.401 0.298
(6.0)*** (7.4)*** (6.0)*** (8.9)*** (6.1)***
[6.9]*** [6.9]*** [10.5]*** [6.9]***
Sex -0.103 -0.016 -0.104 -0.030 -0.088
(0.7) (0.1) (0.7) (0.2) (0.6)
[0.8] [0.8] [0.3] [0.7]
Urban 0.001 0.015 0.001 -0.027 -0.024
(0.0) (0.2) (0.0) (0.2) (0.2)
[0.0] [0.0] [0.3] [0.2]
EducD1 0.280 ref. ref. ref. ref.
(0.3)
[0.3]
EducD2 -0.367 -1.172 -0.618 -0.472 0.960
(0.4) (1.5) (0.8) (0.3) (1.2)
[0.5] [0.8] [0.3] [1.3]
EducD3 -0.580 -1.063 -0.828 -0.499 0.723
(0.7) (1.6) (1.2) (0.4) (1.0)
[0.9] [1.2] [0.4] [1.2]
EducD4 -0.388 -0.661 -0.640 -0.117 0.922
(0.5) (1.0) (0.9) (0.1) (1.3)
[0.6] [0.9] [0.1] [1.5]
EducD5 -0.214 -0.106 -0.465 0.120 1.078
(0.2) (0.1) (0.5) (0.1) (1.3)
[0.3] [0.6] [0.1] [1.5]
EducD6 -0.179 -0.429 -0.427 0.206 1.217
(0.2) (0.7) (0.6) (0.2) (1.7)*
[0.3] [0.6] [0.2] [2.0]**
EducD7 -0.262 -0.284 -0.513 0.154 1.250
(0.3) (0.4) (0.7) (0.1) (1.7)*
[0.4] [0.7] [0.1] [2.0]**
EducD8 -0.573 -0.621 -0.828 -0.169 0.694
(0.7) (0.9) (1.1) (0.1) (0.9)
[0.9] [1.2] [0.1] [1.1]
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Table 2. Baseline regressions for overall stress (continued)
EducD9 -0.042 -0.434 -0.290 0.136 1.293
(0.1) (0.7) (0.4) (0.1) (1.8)*
[0.1] [0.4] [0.1] [2.1]**
EducD10 -0.077 -0.176 -0.328 0.270 1.415
(0.1) (0.3) (0.4) (0.2) (2.0)**
[0.1] [0.5] [0.2] [2.3]**
EducD11 0.049 -0.195 -0.202 0.453 1.438
(0.1) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (2.0)**
[0.1] [0.3] [0.3] [2.4]**
EducD12 -0.524 -0.943 -0.770 0.114 0.784
(0.7) (1.3) (1.0) (0.1) (1.1)
[0.8] [1.1] [0.1] [1.2]
EducD13 ref. 0.373 -0.258 0.243 0.000
(0.4) (0.3) (0.2) (.)
[0.3] [0.2] [.]
EducD14 0.216 -0.323 -0.033 0.475 1.180
(0.2) (0.4) (0.0) (0.3) (1.2)
[0.3] [0.0] [0.3] [1.4]
Immi<10 yrs. -0.917 -0.681 -0.928 -0.206 -0.678
(1.2) (0.9) (1.2) (0.3) (0.9)
[1.2] [1.2] [0.3] [0.9]
Immi>=10 yrs. -0.000 -0.276 -0.008 -0.029 -0.037
(0.0) (0.4) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1)
[0.0] [0.0] [0.1] [0.1]
Gr. Age 2 1.671 1.617 1.667 1.983 1.344
(5.0)*** (6.5)*** (5.0)*** (7.3)*** (4.1)***
[5.3]*** [5.3]*** [7.6]*** [4.3]***
Gr. Age 3 1.804 1.690 1.803 2.159 1.492
(5.7)*** (6.9)*** (5.7)*** (8.3)*** (4.7)***
[6.0]*** [6.0]*** [8.7]*** [5.0]***
Gr. Age 4 2.108 1.830 2.107 2.203 1.733
(6.8)*** (7.5)*** (6.8)*** (8.5)*** (5.6)***
[7.2]*** [7.2]*** [8.9]*** [5.9]***
Gr. Age 5 1.840 1.727 1.840 1.933 1.532
(5.9)*** (7.2)*** (5.9)*** (7.5)*** (4.9)***
[6.3]*** [6.3]*** [7.8]*** [5.2]***
Gr. Age 6 1.635 1.626 1.636 1.582 1.431
(5.3)*** (6.8)*** (5.3)*** (6.1)*** (4.7)***
[5.6]*** [5.6]*** [6.4]*** [5.0]***
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Table 2. Baseline regressions for overall stress (continued)
Gr. Age 7 1.551 1.480 1.551 1.569 1.351
(5.0)*** (6.2)*** (5.0)*** (6.1)*** (4.4)***
[5.3]*** [5.3]*** [6.3]*** [4.6]***
Gr. Age 8 0.711 0.802 0.713 0.769 0.500
(2.3)** (3.4)*** (2.3)** (3.0)*** (1.6)
[2.4]** [2.4]** [3.0]*** [1.7]*
Union density - - -0.667 - -
(0.53)
[0.6]
2000 ref. -0.005 - -0.498 -
(0.1) (5.2)***
[4.7]***
2002 0.005 ref. 0.005 -0.472 0.013
(0.1) (0.1) (4.4)*** (0.1)
[0.1] [0.0] [4.2]*** [0.1]
Constant 14.6 21.1 15.5 20.7 10.1
(6.4)*** (16.1)*** (7.8)*** (12.4)*** (6.7)***
[6.7]*** [7.9]*** [13.3]*** [7.4]***
Birth continent (D1-D7) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Living arrangement (D1-D7) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household type (D1-D6) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household size (D1-D9) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry (D1-D16) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Occupation (D1-D47) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Ind. * Occ. (D1-D342) No No No No Yes
Observations 11421 11421 11421 17069 11421
R-squared 0.08 - 0.08 0.09 0.12
Number of clusters 6752 6752 6752 8386 6752
Robust t-statistics in parentheses ( ) : indiv idual c lustering ; Robust t statistics in brackets [ ] : no ind iv idual clustering ; * sign ifi cant
at 10% ; ** signifi cant at 5% ; *** sign ifi cant at 1%
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Table 3. Impact of EPL on stress when ELP is imputed thanks to EPA-LFS survey
Estimation. robust LS R.E. adds union adds cycle 1 adds Ind.*Occ.
Dep. variable: stress_wrk
EPL_ind_fit 0.187 0.128 0.163 0.126 0.169
(3.0)*** (2.8)*** (2.6)*** (2.3)** (2.5)**
[3.4]*** [3.0]*** [2.8]*** [2.9]***
EPL_coll_fit 0.013 0.017 0.022 0.019 0.018
(0.8) (1.3) (1.2) (1.3) (1.0)
[0.9] [1.4] [1.5] [1.2]
Observations 11421 11421 11421 11421 17069
R2 0.08 - 0.08 0.12 0.12
Number of clusters 6752 6752 6752 6752 6752
Robust t-statistics in parentheses ( ) : ind iv idual clustering ; Robust t statistics in brackets [ ] : no ind iv idual clustering ; A ll t-stat were
adjusted to imputation-error (L ittle -Rub in 1987); * signifi cant at 10% ; ** signifi cant at 5% ; *** signifi cant at 1% ; O ther controls: sam e as
listed in table 2 (age, urban icity, fam ily, education, imm igration, b irth place , year, industry, o ccupation)
Table 4. Regional clustering & variable clustering
Estimation robust LS robust LS robust LS two-step
Cross-sections: 2000 & 2002 2000 2002 2000 & 2002
Dep. variable: stress_wrk stress_wrk stress_wrk
reg. dummies
from first stage
EPL_ind 0.243 0.298 0.193 0.207
(3.43)*** (5.48)*** (2.04)** -
[3.71]*** [3.39]*** [1.97]** [2.40]**
EPL_coll 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.034
(2.32) (2.82)*** (1.14) -
[1.76]* [1.33] [1.27] [1.83]*
Observations 11421 5942 5479 10
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.53
Number of clusters 10 10 10 -
Robust t-statistics in parentheses ( ) : REGIONAL: clustering ; Robust t statistics in brackets [ ] : no REGIONAL clustering ; *
signifi cant at 10% ; ** signifi cant at 5% ; *** signifi cant at 1% ; O ther controls: same as listed in table 2 (age, urban icity, fam ily, education,
imm igration, b irth place, year, industry, o ccupation)
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Table 5. Sub components of stress
Dep. variable: stress from Work (total) Skills need Latitude dec. Psych. demands Job insec. Phy. exertion Superv.-cowk Job strain
EPL_ind 0.257 -0.014 0.039 0.186 -0.034 0.037 -0.019 0.028
(3.4)*** (0.4) (1.4) (6.2)*** (2.0)** (2.0)** (0.6) (5.4)***
[3.9]*** [0.5] [1.6] [7.1]*** [2.3]** [2.3]** [0.7] [5.9]***
EPL_coll 0.023 -0.008 0.006 -0.025 0.009 -0.013 0.043 -0.003
(1.5) (1.3) (1.1) (4.3)*** (2.7)*** (3.5)*** (7.0)*** (3.1)***
[1.8]* [1.5] [1.3] [4.9]*** [2.9]*** [4.1]*** [7.6]*** [3.5]***
Sex -0.072 0.557 0.477 0.080 0.088 -0.084 -0.172 0.073
(0.5) (8.2)*** (8.9)*** (1.4) (2.7)*** (2.3)** (2.8)*** (7.0)***
[0.5] [9.5]*** [10.1]*** [1.6] [3.0]*** [2.7]*** [3.0]*** [7.7]***
Observations 11224 11340 11335 11326 11332 11344 11258 11315
R-squared 0.08 0.32 0.18 0.10 0.06 0.34 0.04 0.11
Number of clusters 6696 6715 6714 6713 6714 6716 6702 6710
Adding regional union density
Dep. variable: stress from Work (total) Skill need Latitude dec. Psych. demands Job insec. Phy. exertion Superv.-cowk Job strain
EPL_ind 0.248 -0.038 0.008 0.094 0.007 0.002 0.079 0.014
(3.2)*** (1.2) (0.3) (3.0)*** (0.4) (0.1) (2.4)** (2.6)***
[3.6]*** [1.4] [0.3] [3.5]*** [0.5] [0.1] [2.6]*** [2.9]***
EPL_coll 0.024 -0.005 0.010 -0.014 0.003 -0.008 0.031 -0.001
(1.5) (0.8) (1.7)* (2.2)** (1.0) (2.1)** (4.5)*** (1.3)
[1.7]* [0.9] [1.9]* [2.5]** [1.1] [2.4]** [5.0]*** [1.4]
Sex -0.073 0.555 0.474 0.072 0.092 -0.088 -0.162 0.072
(0.5) (8.2)*** (8.9)*** (1.3) (2.8)*** (2.4)** (2.6)*** (6.9)***
[0.6] [9.5]*** [10.1]*** [1.4] [3.1]*** [2.8]*** [2.8]*** [7.6]***
Union density -0.301 -0.747 -0.958 -2.852 1.298 -1.099 3.052 -0.436
(0.2) (1.4) (2.2)** (5.8)*** (4.5)*** (3.7)*** (5.7)*** (5.1)***
[0.3] [1.6] [2.4]** [6.5]*** [5.1]*** [4.2]*** [6.3]*** [5.6]***
Observations 11224 11340 11335 11326 11332 11344 11258 11315
R-squared 0.08 0.32 0.18 0.11 0.06 0.34 0.05 0.11
Number of clusters 6696 6715 6714 6713 6714 6716 6702 6710
Robust t-statistics in parentheses ( ) : indiv idual c lustering ; Robust t statistics in brackets [ ] : no ind iv idual clustering ; * sign ifi cant
at 10% ; ** signifi cant at 5% ; *** signifi cant at 1% ; O ther controls: sam e as listed in table 2 (age, urbanic ity, fam ily, education, imm igration,
b irth place, year, industry, o ccupation, + body weight dumm ies). See the text for the fu ll description of le ft handside variab les.
Table 6. “Base” questions
Dep. variable: No learning No high skills No freedom(a) No repetitivity Not hectic Conflicting No job security
EPL_ind -0.055 -0.052 0.012 -0.001 -0.088 0.086 0.012
(1.6) (1.4) (0.8) (0.0) (2.5)** (2.6)** (0.3)
[1.8]* [1.6] [0.8] [0.0] [2.9]*** [2.8]*** [0.4]
EPL_coll 0.020 0.020 0.009 0.048 0.017 -0.008 0.005
(2.9)*** (2.6)*** (2.7)*** (6.6)*** (2.3)** (1.2) (0.7)
[3.1]*** [3.0]*** [3.0]*** [7.4]*** [2.6]*** [1.3] [0.8]
Union density 2.866 1.513 0.302 5.927 3.900 -1.074 2.359
(5.0)*** (2.6)** (1.2) (10.1)*** (6.8)*** (2.0)** (3.8)***
[5.4]*** [2.8]*** [1.3] [11.4]*** [7.7]*** [2.1]** [4.3]***
Trauma -0.030 -0.028 0.015 -0.080 -0.079 0.072 0.075
(1.3) (1.2) (1.4) (3.5)*** (3.7)*** (3.3)*** (3.3)***
[1.4] [1.4] [1.6] [3.9]*** [4.1]*** [3.6]*** [3.5]***
Sex 0.318 0.541 0.202 -0.280 -0.182 -0.034 0.203
(4.7)*** (7.7)*** (6.7)*** (3.9)*** (2.7)*** (0.5) (2.9)***
[5.0]*** [8.6]*** [7.4]*** [4.4]*** [3.0]*** [0.6] [3.2]***
Observations 11346 11343 11344 11344 11343 11328 11332
Dep. variable: No physical No discretion No hostility(a) Superv. not help
No help in getting
job done(a)
Satisfied
with job?(a)
EPL_ind -0.004 -0.015 -0.037 0.055 0.007 0.017
(0.1) (0.4) (2.0)** (1.6) (0.6) (1.4)
[0.1] [0.5] [2.2]** [1.8]* [0.7] [1.5]
EPL_coll 0.015 0.003 -0.010 0.014 0.013 -0.000
(2.0)** (0.4) (2.7)*** (2.0)* (5.7)*** (0.2)
[2.3]** [0.4] [3.0]*** [2.1]** [6.0]*** [0.2]
Union density 2.260 -2.713 -0.340 2.844 1.246 0.092
(3.9)*** (4.7)*** (1.1) (5.2)*** (6.2)*** (0.5)
[4.4]*** [5.1]*** [1.3] [5.5]*** [6.5]*** [0.5]
Trauma -0.089 0.010 -0.061 0.046 0.024 0.024
(4.0)*** (0.4) (5.1)*** (2.1)** (3.2)*** (2.9)***
[4.5]*** [0.5] [5.7]*** [2.2]** [3.1]*** [3.3]***
Sex 0.138 0.598 0.068 -0.259 0.025 0.064
(1.9)* (8.9)*** (1.9)* (4.0)*** (1.1) (2.8)***
[2.2]** [9.9]*** [2.1]** [4.3]*** [1.1] [3.0]***
Observations 11344 11337 11338 11273 11314 11344
Robust t-statistics in parentheses ( ) : indiv idual c lustering ; Robust t statistics in brackets [ ] : no ind iv idual clustering ; * sign ifi cant
at 10% ; ** signifi cant at 5% ; *** signifi cant at 1% ; Dep endent: 1 : strongly agree . . . 5 d isagree ; For instance, in thecolumn no learn ing,
a positive co eﬃ cient m eans that the higher the variab le, the more likeley there is “no learn ing” on the job.O ther controls: sam e as listed in
Table 7. Elements of falsification: impact of EPL on other forms of stress (unrelated to work)
Dep. variable: Stress_chron Stress_perso Stress_fin Stress_chron Stress_perso Stress_fin
EPL_ind 0.057 0.036 -0.013 0.035 0.021 -0.015
(1.8)* (1.7) (1.3)* (1.2) (1.0) (1.4)
[2.1]** [2.0]** [1.3]* [1.4] [1.2] [1.5]
EPL_coll -0.011 -0.003 -0.004 -0.013 -0.004 -0.004
(1.9)* (0.7) (2.0)** (2.3)** (1.1) (2.1)**
[2.2]* [0.8] [2.1]** [2.7]*** [1.2] [2.1]**
Trauma 0.221 0.109 0.030 0.191 0.087 0.028
(10.3)*** (7.6)*** (4.6)*** (9.3)*** (6.4)*** (4.1)***
[12.0]*** [8.9]*** [4.8]*** [10.7]*** [7.4]*** [4.3]***
Sex 0.218 0.231 -0.072 0.241 0.248 -0.071
(4.5)*** (7.0)*** (4.7)*** (5.2)*** (7.8)*** (4.6)***
[3.2]*** [8.0]*** [4.0]*** [5.9]*** [8.8]*** [4.9]***
Observations 11441 11437 11468 11441 11437 11468
Stress_wrk - - - 0.095 0.069 0.007
(19.0)*** (19.6)*** (4.2)***
[20.1]*** [20.9]*** [4.3]***
R-squared 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.11 0.04
Number of clusters 6773 6771 6780 6773 6771 6780
Robust t-statistics in parentheses ( ) : ind iv idual c lustering ; * signifi cant at 10% ; ** signifi cant at 5% ; *** signifi cant at 1% ; O ther
controls: same as listed in table 2 (age , urbanicity, fam ily, education, imm igration, b irth place, year, EXCEPT industry, o ccupation)
Table 8. IV model. Individual determinants of employment: local labor market variables as instru-
ments
First stage: individual employment probability WLS RE
Dep. variable: Individual employment Individual employment
Local Unemp. rate -0.004 -0.015
(4.1)*** (3.8)***
Local Activity rate 0.003 0.014
(3.3)*** (3.3)***
Local population density 0.000 0.000
(1.5) (1.5)
Local share of male 0.381 1.681
(0.8) (0.9)
Population growth 1996-01 0.001 0.003
(0.8) (1.0)
EPL_ind 0.010 0.037
(2.0)** (1.9)*
EP_coll -0.001 -0.004
(1.3) (1.0)
Trauma -0.018 -0.075
(6.4)*** (6.9)***
Sex -0.177 -0.799
(19.0)*** (19.1)***
Observations 41357 41357
R-squared 0.21
Number of clusters 11037 11037
Robust t-statistics in parentheses ( ) : ind iv idual c lustering ; * signifi cant at 10% ; ** signifi cant at 5% ; *** signifi cant at 1% ; O ther
controls: sam e as listed in table 2 (age, urban icity, fam ily, education, imm igration, b irth p lace, year EXCEPT industry, o ccupation, and in
add ition , household size interacted w ith gender). NB : no correction for clustering w ith in lo cal lab or markets. Local controls: C ensus div ision
(county) level.
Table 9. IV probit models. Anti-depressors and EPL
Probit IV-Prob Probit IV-Prob Probit IV-Prob Probit IV-Prob Probit IV-Prob
Dep. variable: Depress Depress Antidepr Antidepr Tranquil Tranquil Sleeping Sleeping Highbld Highbld
Empl.*EPL_ind 0.041 0.057 0.024 0.081 0.045 0.060 0.010 0.013 -0.037 0.000
(2.6)** (2.8)*** (1.1) (2.9)*** (1.9)* (2.0)* (0.4) (0.5) (1.7)* (0.0)
Empl.*EPL_coll 0.003 0.003 -0.005 -0.006 0.015 0.022 -0.009 -0.010 0.007 0.008
(0.8) (0.7) (1.0) (1.1) (2.6)** (3.3)*** (1.8)* (1.7)* (1.4) (1.4)
Empl. -0.517 -0.622 -0.495 -0.835 -0.707 -1.020 -0.363 -0.237 -0.133 -1.077
(7.4)*** (2.3)** (5.0)*** (2.2)** (6.7)*** (2.4)** (3.5)*** (0.6) (1.4) (3.0)***
Trauma 0.153 0.151 0.126 0.122 0.122 0.119 0.104 0.107 0.034 0.019
(17.3)*** (15.4)*** (10.3)*** (9.0)*** (8.8)*** (7.6)*** (8.0)*** (7.3)*** (2.5)** (1.3)
Sex 0.216 0.210 0.331 0.306 0.113 0.087 0.155 0.166 0.074 -0.030
(8.3)*** (5.2)*** (8.9)*** (5.4)*** (2.7)*** (1.4) (4.1)*** (2.7)*** (2.1)** (0.6)
Urban 0.000 -0.006 0.050 0.034 0.060 0.058 0.046 0.041 0.017 0.022
(0.0) (0.2) (1.3) (0.9) (1.3) (1.3) (1.1) (1.0) (0.5) (0.6)
No social insurance -0.105 -0.058 -0.117 -0.072 -0.129 -0.091 -0.114 -0.102
(2.9)*** (1.6) (2.8)*** (1.8)* (3.3)*** (2.4)** (3.4)*** (3.0)***
Constant -6.818 -6.740 -1.989 -1.990 -1.703 -0.640 -1.471 -1.503 -0.414 0.582
(39.8)*** (30.3)*** (3.1)*** (2.9)*** (4.1)*** (0.8) (3.5)*** (3.0)*** (1.0) (0.7)
Observations 40450 40354 32272 32222 32319 32269 32281 32231 32327 32277
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.18 0.17
Number of clusters 10955 10950 10193 10191 10198 10196 10195 10193 10197 10195
Hansen J-test exog 6 instr. 2.76 7.226 3.861 7.001 6.745
χ2(6): p-value 0.838 0.300 0.700 0.320 0.345
Robust t-statistics in parentheses ( ) : indiv idual c lustering ; Robust t statistics in brackets [ ] : no ind iv idual clustering ; * sign ifi cant
at 10% ; ** signifi cant at 5% ; *** signifi cant at 1% ; O ther controls: sam e as listed in table 2 (age, urbanic ity, fam ily, education, imm igration,
b irth place, year EXCEPT industry, o ccupation).
Table A. Summary of notations
Worker Firm
Control variables Control variables
Eﬀort e ≥e Working conditions qw≶ 0
Monitoring intensity qm≥ 0
Random variables Random variables
Utility of the match ν Productivity of the match ε
Density h(ν) = h0in [νmin, νmax] Density g(ε) = g0in [εmin, εmax]
Parameters and functional forms Parameters and functional forms
Minimum eﬀort e Success rate of of F-layoﬀ F (qm,e−e)
Eﬀort requirement e Outside profits π
Wage w NF firing cost τ
Stress from F-layoﬀ Σ Cost of qm C0(q
m)2
Outside utility U Cost of qw C1(q
w)2
Cost of eﬀort c(e) = e2
Table B1. NPHS Longitudinal Household Component Sample Size by Province in 1994-1995, Number
of Persons
Longitudinal Sample
Cycle 1 (1994-1995)
Records providing a full response
in Cycles 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
Newfoundland Terre-Neuve 1,082 822
Prince Edward Island Île-du-Prince-Édouard 1,037 803
Nova Scotia Nouvelle-Écosse 1,085 775
New Brunswick Nouveau-Brunswick 1,125 824
Québec Québec 3,000 2,189
Ontario Ontario 4,307 2,990
Manitoba Manitoba 1,205 921
Saskatchewan Saskatchewan 1,168 922
Alberta Alberta 1,544 1,111
British Columbia Colombie-Britannique 1,723 1,189
TOTAL TOTAL 17,276 12,546
Table B2. Refusal and Don’t Know Rates at the Respondent Level. Source: Longitudinal Documen-
tation, ENSP-Cycle 5
Jurisdiction  Length of service Employer 
notice (wks.)
Number of employees Notice (wks.)
Federal 3 months + 2 50 + 16
3 mos - 2 yrs 1
2 yrs - 4 yrs 2
4 yrs - 6 yrs 4
6 yrs  - 8 yrs 5
8yrs-10yrs 6
10 yrs + 8
6 mos - 3 yrs 2
3 yrs 3
1 addit. wk for each addit. 
yr of employ.-max 8 wks.
8
50 - 100 10
101 - 300 14
300+ 18
6 mos - 5 yrs 2
5 yrs + 4
1 mo - 2 yrs 1 50 - 199 8
200 - 499 12
500+ 16
less than 2 yrs 1 10 - 99 8
2 yrs - 5 yrs 2 100 - 299 12
5yrs-10yrs 4
l0yrs+ 8
3 mos - 1 yr 1 50 - 199 8
1 yr-3yrs 2 200 - 499 12
3 yrs - 4 yrs 3
4 yrs - 5 yrs 4
5 yrs - 6 yrs 5
6 yrs - 7 yrs 6
7 yrs - 8 yrs 7
8 yrs + 8
6 mos - 5 yrs 2
5 yrs+ 4
3 mos - 1 yr 1 10 - 99 2 mos
1 yr-5yrs 2 100 - 299 3 mos
5 yrs-10 yrs 4
10 yrs+ 8
3 mos - 1 yr 1 10 - 49 4
1 yr - 3 yrs 2 50 - 99 8
3 yrs - 5 yrs 4
5 yrs -10 yrs 6
10 yrs + 8
Source: Labour Canada, Employment Standards Legislation in Canada.
Saskatchewan
100+ 12
Prince Edward Island no special provision
Quebec
300 + 4 mos
Ontario
500+ 16
Nova Scotia
300+ 16
Newfoundland
2 yrs + 2
New Brunswick 10 or more, if they represent 
25% of the employer's 
workforce
6
Manitoba 1 month + 1 pay period
Alberta No special provision
British Columbia No special provision
Table B. Notice requirements for termination of employment, various jurisdictions in Canada, 1995.
Individual Mass
Table B3. Regressions for overall stress, additional controls
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dep. variable: stress_wrk
EPL_ind 0.246 0.207 0.259 0.222 0.207 0.229 0.238 0.213 0.191 0.189
(3.3)*** (2.9)*** (3.4)*** (3.0)*** (2.8)*** (3.1)*** (3.2)*** (2.6)*** (2.4)** (2.3)**
[3.8]*** [3.3]*** [3.9]*** [3.4]*** [3.2]*** [3.5]*** [3.7]*** [3.0]*** [2.7]*** [2.6]***
EPL_coll 0.021 0.027 0.023 0.025 0.030 0.028 0.025 0.020 0.020 0.026
(1.4) (1.9)* (1.5) (1.7)* (2.1)** (1.9)* (1.6) (1.3) (1.3) (1.5)
[1.7]* [2.2]** [1.8]* [2.0]** [2.4]** [2.2]** [1.8]* [1.5] [1.5] [1.7]*
Stresschron 0.633 0.585 0.634 0.556
(20.3)*** (18.2)*** (20.2)*** (16.9)***
[21.6]*** [19.3]*** [21.5]*** [18.0]***
Local Unemp. rate -0.018 -0.015 -0.013
(1.4) (0.9) (0.7)
[1.6] [1.0] [0.8]
Other local controls No No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Other language (ref: Engl.) -0.471 -0.497
(2.0)** (2.3)**
[2.2]** [2.4]**
French language -0.113 -0.014
(0.7) (0.1)
[0.8] [0.1]
Support received -0.760 -0.477
(9.8)*** (6.2)***
[10.6]*** [6.7]***
Health -4.626 -2.589 -2.309
(9.7)*** (5.7)*** (5.1)***
[10.4]*** [6.0]*** [5.3]***
Body weight (6 dummy var.) No No Yes No Yes No No No No Yes
Observations 11472 11447 11224 11420 11151 11265 11472 11472 11447 10962
R-squared 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.15
Robust t-statistics in parentheses ( ) : indiv idual c lustering ; Robust t statistics in brackets [ ] : no ind iv idual clustering ; * sign ifi cant
at 10% ; ** sign ifi cant at 5% ; *** signifi cant at 1% ; O ther controls: same as listed in table 2 (gender, age, urbanic ity, fam ily, education,
imm igration, b irth place, year, industry, o ccupation, trauma)
Table B4. Regressions for components of stress, interaction of EPL with local labor markets
Dep. variable: stress from Work (total) Skill need Latitude dec. Conflicts Layoﬀ Phy. exert. Cowk-manag. Strain
EPL_ind 0.188 0.081 0.091 0.247 -0.070 0.112 -0.167 0.042
(1.5) (1.4) (2.0)* (4.8)*** (2.4)** (3.5)*** (3.0)*** (4.7)***
[1.7]* [1.6] [2.2]** [5.4]*** [2.7]*** [4.1]*** [3.3]*** [5.2]***
EPL_coll 0.058 -0.001 0.016 -0.031 0.015 -0.011 0.069 -0.002
(1.7)* (0.0) (1.4) (2.3)** (2.0)** (1.3) (4.8)*** (0.7)
[1.9]* [0.0] [1.5] [2.6]*** [2.2]** [1.4] [5.2]*** [0.8]
Local unemp. rate 0.009 0.048 0.034 0.015 -0.004 0.030 -0.030 0.007
(0.2) (2.2)** (2.0)** (0.8) (0.4) (2.6)*** (1.5) (2.1)**
[0.2] [2.5]** [2.3]** [0.9] [0.4] [2.9]*** [1.6] [2.4]**
EPL_ind * u-rate 0.004 -0.008 -0.004 -0.009 0.006 -0.009 0.014 -0.002
(0.3) (1.5) (1.0) (2.0)** (2.3)** (3.0)*** (2.9)*** (2.1)**
[0.3] [1.7]* [1.1] [2.2]** [2.6]*** [3.4]*** [3.1]*** [2.3]**
EPL_coll * u-rate -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.000
(1.2) (0.5) (1.0) (0.4) (0.8) (0.3) (2.0)** (0.7)
[1.4] [0.6] [1.1] [0.4] [0.9] [0.3] [2.2]** [0.8]
Trauma 0.300 0.019 0.030 0.081 0.042 0.045 0.106 0.018
(5.9)*** (0.9) (1.7)* (4.3)*** (3.8)*** (3.9)*** (5.1)*** (5.1)***
[6.8]*** [1.0] [1.9]* [4.8]*** [4.1]*** [4.5]*** [5.4]*** [5.6]***
Sex -0.076 0.553 0.470 0.074 0.092 -0.088 -0.165 0.072
(0.5) (8.2)*** (8.7)*** (1.3) (2.7)*** (2.4)** (2.7)*** (6.9)***
[0.6] [9.4]*** [10.0]*** [1.5] [3.1]*** [2.8]*** [2.9]*** [7.5]***
Observations 11224 11340 11335 11326 11332 11344 11258 11315
R-squared 0.08 0.32 0.18 0.10 0.06 0.34 0.04 0.11
Robust t-statistics in parentheses ( ) : indiv idual c lustering ; Robust t statistics in brackets [ ] : no ind iv idual clustering ; * sign ifi cant
at 10% ; ** signifi cant at 5% ; *** signifi cant at 1% ; O ther controls: sam e as listed in table 2 (age, urbanic ity, fam ily, education, imm igration,
b irth place, year, industry, o ccupation). A higher level of unemploym ent interact positively w ith indiv idual EPL on stress asso ciated w ith the
risk of lo osing one’s job , as exp ected , and stress due to co-workers and managers. It interacts negatively on physica l, psychologica l stress and
stress asso ciated w ith stra in .
Table B5. What determines depression? A first attempt (sc refer to score ; pp to probability ; cf.
text)
Dep. variable: Depress sc Depress sc Depress sc Depress sc Depress pp Depress pp Depress pp Depress pp
Stresschron 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.022 0.022 0.022
(14.0)*** (14.0)*** (13.9)*** (14.4)*** (14.4)*** (14.4)***
[14.9]*** [14.9]*** [14.9]*** [15.0]*** [15.1]*** [15.0]***
EPL_ind 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.2) (0.4) (0.1) (0.3) (0.2) (0.4) (0.1) (0.0)
[0.2] [0.5] [0.1] [0.3] [0.2] [0.5] [0.1] [0.0]
EPL_coll -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(1.1) (0.5) (1.1) (0.9) (1.4) (0.9) (1.4) (1.1)
[1.2] [0.6] [1.2] [0.9] [1.6] [1.0] [1.5] [1.2]
Trauma 0.088 0.121 0.087 0.087 0.013 0.018 0.014 0.013
(6.7)*** (10.1)*** (6.6)*** (6.6)*** (6.8)*** (10.4)*** (6.8)*** (6.8)***
[6.9]*** [12.4]*** [6.8]*** [6.8]*** [7.0]*** [12.7]*** [7.1]*** [7.0]***
Sex 0.095 0.124 0.098 0.098 0.017 0.020 0.016 0.017
(2.7)*** (4.1)*** (2.7)*** (2.7)*** (3.1)*** (4.5)*** (3.1)*** (3.1)***
[2.9]*** [4.9]*** [3.0]*** [2.9]*** [3.3]*** [5.3]*** [3.3]*** [3.3]***
Local unemp. rate -0.001 0.003 -0.000 0.000
(0.2) (0.8) (0.8) (0.3)
[0.3] [0.8] [0.8] [0.3]
Local activity rate 0.005 0.001
(1.4) (1.3)
[1.4] [1.3]
Local density 0.000 0.000
(0.2) (0.1)
[0.2] [0.1]
Local share of male -1.575 -0.192
(0.9) (0.7)
[0.9] [0.7]
Population growth 1996-01 -0.001 -0.000
(0.2) (0.3)
[0.2] [0.3]
Observations 18664 32273 18623 18623 18623 32273 18664 18623
R-squared 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.07
Robust t-statistics in parentheses ( ) : indiv idual c lustering ; Robust t statistics in brackets [ ] : no ind iv idual clustering ; * sign ifi cant
at 10% ; ** signifi cant at 5% ; *** signifi cant at 1% ; O ther controls: sam e as listed in table 2 (age, urbanic ity, fam ily, education, imm igration,
b irth place, year, EXCEPT industry, o ccupation).
Figure 2. Correlation between EPL_ind and Stress at work (total)
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Figure 3. Correlation between EPL_ind and Psychological Stress at work
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Figure 4. Correlation between EPL_ind and Stress from Skill needs at work
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Figure 5. Correlation between EPL_ind and Stress from Job Loss
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C Technical Appendix: construction and verification of regional
EPL indices
C.1 Construction
To create a single index for individual protection and another one for collective protection against dis-
missals, we created two grids, common to all provinces: one for seniority (12 categories) and one for firm
size (8 categories). We then calculate from table B an average across all lines of the grid of the notice
period. Table C provides the averages per province. We thus obtain two indicators of absolute individual
and collective EPL. It is interesting to notice that the correlation across regions of the two indicators is
not very strong: it is even negative (-0.24). Alternatively, one can build relative indicators of individual
and collective EPL, based on the position of each province in the distribution of EPL legislation. They
appear to be very correlated with absolute measures, with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.92, so hereafter
we focus only on absolute indicators.
C.2 Comparison
We investigate the impact of these variables on EPL indicators. A crucial question is how to identify
the EPL eﬀects, both individual and collective. We can now show a number of correlation indicating
that our indicators capture some important dimension of regional labor market conditions. A business
report from the Fraser Institute provides indicators of provincial ”labour market regulations”, including
EPL but also various other dimensions of labor relations.31 Provinces are scored from 0 to 10 on each
indicator. A score of 10 indicates an optimal labour law in terms of providing labour-market flexibility.
To ease the comparability with our EPL indices, we take a linear transformation of the Fraser Institute
indicator, in applying x → 10 − x : a positive correlation coeﬃcient between our EPL index and the
Fraser Institute index will thus indicate that two indices are coïncident. The report of Fraser institute in
addition reports the ranking of regions (1 for the most flexible to 10 for the less flexible).
We display the correlation matrix between our EPL indices, where EPL_both is the sum of the two
EPL indicators and LMR is the index of labor market regulation from Fraser Institute (rk stands for
the ranking index and sc for the score). It appears that collective EPL is pretty well correlated with
both indicators of the Fraser institute. Individual EPL is positively correlated too but to a lesser extent.
Figure C1 confirms that the correlation with the sum of the two indicators is pretty good, especially if
British Columbia is excluded from the calculation.
EPL_both EPL_ind EPL_coll LMR(rk) LMR(sc)
EPL_both 1
EPL_ind 0.1782 1
EPL_coll 0.913 -0.2387 1
FI-LMR(rk) 0.515 0.2716 0.3956 1
FI-LMR(sc) 0.4285 0.1083 0.378 0.9257 1
Note: correlation co eﬃ cients b etween various indicators of EPL
Another check is to correlate EPL indicators with the duration of unemployment spells. Indeed, most
existing theory points out that employer will be more reluctant to create jobs and take risks when EPL
is more important. We find that the correlation between collective EPL and unemployment duration is
31”The Index of Labour Market Regulation assesses several indicators of the provincial labour-relations laws.
Specifically, the following aspects of the relation laws are examined: (1) processes of certification and decertifica-
tion; (2) arbitration process; (3) union security; (4) successor rights; (5) treatment of technology; (6) replacement
workers; (7) third-party picketing; and (8) openness of the provincial Labour Relations Boards.” Details in Clemens
et al. (2003), a report of the Fraser Institute. The website of the institute is presented as follows: ”Established in
1974, The Fraser Institute is an independent public policy organization with oﬃces in Vancouver, Calgary, and
Toronto.”
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positive and relatively large, while the correlation between individual EPL and unemployment duration
is pretty small and actually negative. The correlation with the sum of the two indicators (EPL_both)
is however fairly positive, which is reinsuring. Finally, we can simply correlate EPL with union density.
Again, there is a clear pattern of positive correlation between collective EPL and union density: the
correlation is 0.46 and reaches 0.61 if one outlier is taken away. See also Figure C2.
D Technical Appendix:
D.1 Covariance matrix of error terms with individual and regional clustering
Let first assume that the error term follows
εit = ui + eit
where i is the individual and t is time, where the εit is iid. We assume two time periods for simplicity of
the exposition. The covariance matrix of residuals is then given by:
Z1 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
σ2e + σ
2
u σ
2
u
σ2u σ
2
e + σ
2
u
0 0 0
0
σ2e + σ2u σ2u
σ2u σ2e + σ2u
0 0
0 0
σ2e + σ
2
u σ
2
u
σ2u σ2e + σ2u
0
0 0 0
. . .
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
In this case, standard correction techniques available in all softwares apply. The problem becomes more
severe with a three-level structure for residuals: we have 2 time observations, 2 regions and n individuals,
as follows:
εirt = vr + uri + erit
where r = A,B is a region and vr is a regional eﬀect, uri is an individual eﬀect. Assume for simplicity of
the exposition that individuals 1, 2 are in region A and individual 3 in region B. In matricial notations,
we have
ε =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
vA + uA1 + eA11
vA + uA1 + eA12
vA + uA2 + eA21
vA + uA2 + eA22
vB + uB3 + eB31
vB + uB3 + eA32
...
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
The covariance matrix then becomes
Z2 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
σ2e + σ2u + σ2v σ2u + σ2v
σ2u + σ2v σ2e + σ2u + σ2v
σ2v σ2v
σ2v σ2v
0 0
σ2v σ
2
v
σ2v σ2v
σ2e + σ
2
u σ
2
u
σ2u σ2e + σ2u
0 0
0 0
σ2e + σ2u σ2u
σ2u σ2e + σ2u
σ2v σ2v
σ2v σ2v
0 0
σ2v σ2v
σ2v σ2v
. . .
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
In that matrix, the dimension of the upper left block is T , the dimension of the 2*2 block is nA ∗ T
that is the total number of observations in region A if nA is the number of individuals in region A,
53
etc...One can notably see that
Z2 = Z1 +
⎛
⎜⎝
σ2v ∗ J(nA ∗ T ) 0 0
0 σ2v ∗ J(nA ∗ T ) 0
0 0
. . .
⎞
⎟⎠
where J(p) is a square matrix of 1s of dimension p. This additivity may be used to estimate σv in a first
step, and then obtain corrected s.e. in the second stage. However, given that ρ seem to be small and
importantly, of opposite signs across the two waves, we will not investigate this issue further.
D.2 Correction of s.e. of the generated (imputed) regressors
We apply here Little and Rubin’s (1987) correction (pp. 256-57): let bθl, l = 1, ..,M be the estimated
coeﬃcient of EPL in the NPHS regression, when the regressor is obtained from the lth of M bootstrap
imputation from the EPA-LFS survey. Let cWl be its estimated variance. The estimate of θ is simply
θM =M−1
MX
l=1
bθl (D16)
whereas the within-imputation variance is
WM =M−1
MX
l=1
cWl (D17)
The between-imputation component is
BM = (M − 1)−1
MX
l=1
³bθl − θM´2 (D18)
and total variance is
TM =WM +
M + 1
M
BM (D19)
In our case, M = 20. As we impute two variables (EPL_ind and EPL_coll) we adapt equation (D18) so
has to transform the scalar
³bθl − θM´2 into the matrix ³bθl − θM´0 ³bθl − θM´.
In practice, we found that the ratio of the within to the between component is typically very large,
that is, about 4500 for the imputation of EPL_ind and 370 for EPL_coll, so that the s.e. in practice
diﬀer little from the robust s.e. estimated from GLS: an approximation is
s.e.bootsrap '
¡
WM
¢0.5µ
1 +
BM
WM
M + 1
2M
¶
' s.e.robust(1.000016) for EPL_ind
' s.e.robust(1.00041) for EPL_coll
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Figure C1. Ex-post check of the EPL variables. EPL_ind+EPL_coll vs. Employment Regulation
Index
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Figure C2. Ex-post check of the EPL variables. EPL_coll vs. union rate
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Table C. Construction of regional indices of EPL
IND 1995 mean sd
seniority Alberta BC Man NB NF NS Ont PEI QC Sask NWT Yuk
0,083333333 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,33 0,65134
0,25 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 0 0,83 0,71774
0,5 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1,42 0,51493
1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1,67 0,49237
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1,92 0,28868
3 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 4 3 1 2,33 0,7785
4 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 4 4 1 2,75 1,13818
5 4 5 2 4 2 4 5 4 4 6 5 1 3,83 1,4668
6 5 6 2 4 2 4 6 4 4 6 6 1 4,17 1,74946
7 5 7 2 4 2 4 7 4 4 6 7 1 4,42 2,06522
8 6 8 2 4 2 4 8 4 4 6 8 1 4,75 2,45412
9 6 8 2 4 2 4 8 4 4 6 8 1 4,75 2,45412
10 8 8 2 4 2 8 8 4 8 8 8 1 5,75 2,89592
12 8 8 2 4 2 8 8 4 8 8 8 1 5,75 2,89592
mean 3,79 4,50 2,00 2,71 1,71 3,29 4,50 2,71 3,29 4,29 4,64 0,86 3,19 1,22865
COLL 1995
size Alberta BC Man NB NF NS Ont PEI QC Sask NWT Yuk
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 0
10 0 0 0 6 0 8 0 0 8 4 0 0 2,17 3,35297
25 0 0 0 6 0 8 0 0 8 4 4 4 2,83 3,24271
50 0 0 10 6 8 8 8 0 8 8 8 8 6,00 3,71728
100 0 0 14 6 8 12 8 0 12 12 12 12 8,00 5,32575
200 0 0 14 6 12 12 12 0 12 12 12 12 8,67 5,54868
300 0 0 14 6 12 16 12 0 16 12 16 16 10,00 6,6606
500 0 0 18 6 16 16 16 0 16 12 16 16 11,00 7,31126
1000 0 0 18 6 16 16 16 0 16 12 16 16 11,00 7,31126
mean 0,00 0,00 9,78 5,33 8,00 10,67 8,00 0,00 10,67 8,44 9,33 9,33 6,63 4,23955
COLL+IND 3,79 4,50 11,78 8,05 9,71 13,95 12,50 2,71 13,95 12,73 13,98 10,19 9,82 4,14956

